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 SUMMARY 
 
The South African concept of freedom of testation is one of the most absolute 
concepts of freedom of testation in westernised legal systems. It is suggested 
that the South African concept of freedom of testation is a memento of 
capitalist patriarchy.  As the South African legal system practices a nearly 
absolute concept of freedom of testation, capitalist patriarchy has maintained 
masculine control of property in South Africa and perpetuated the systems of 
male dominance prevalent in South Africa. Freedom of testation allows for 
wealth to pass from one male to another. It also allows entrenched gender 
roles to continue by excluding women from inheriting. Thus the South African 
law of testate succession and its central concept of freedom of testation 
allows for discrimination on the ground of gender. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 1.1 Problem Statement 
 
The principle of freedom of testation is the foundation of the South African law 
of testate succession.1 The South African concept of freedom of testation is 
one of the most absolute concepts of freedom of testation in westernised legal 
systems.2 The South African concept of freedom of testation currently allows a 
testator to dispose of his estate in any way he wishes with few common law 
and statutory exceptions.3  
 
A testator‟s will may be declared invalid for the following reasons, if the 
instructions contained therein are illegal; if the instructions are contrary to 
public policy or if they are vague and uncertain.4 A testator is also restricted 
by a few common law and statutory restrictions, such as those concerning the 
disposal of immovable property, the right of a minor child to claim 
maintenance from the estate and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act.5 
Despite these limitations the South African concept of freedom of testation is 
considered to be very broad and unfettered. 
 
It is suggested that the South African concept of freedom of testation is a 
memento of capitalist patriarchy.6  The concept of freedom of testation has 
evolved throughout history to support and perpetuate capitalist patriarchy. 
                                                 
1  De Waal and Schoeman-Malan Introduction to Succession 4. 
2  Hahlo HR “The case against freedom of testation” 1959 SALJ 436. 
3  Corbett MM et al The Law of Succession in South Africa 34. 
4  Corbett et al The Law of Succession in South Africa 40. 
5  Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990, hereinafter referred to as 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act. De Waal Introduction to the Law of 
Succession 4. See also Corbett et al The Law of Succession in South Africa 40. 
6  The use of the term „capitalist patriarchy‟ has different connotations to it than, 
„capitalism and patriarchy‟. This will be discussed later in the study. However it is 
difficult to differentiate between the two. In general this study uses the term 
„capitalist patriarchy‟. 
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Freedom of testation allows for the exclusion of women from the ownership 
and control of wealth. “Inherited wealth and power can enforce patriarchy”.7 
As the South African legal system practices a nearly absolute concept of 
freedom of testation, capitalist patriarchy has maintained masculine control of 
property in South Africa and perpetuated the systems of male dominance 
prevalent in South Africa. 
 
Despite the preamble of the Constitution8 promising to, „Heal the divisions of 
the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice 
and fundamental human rights‟, and „Improve the quality of life of all citizens‟, 
the inequalities perpetuated through free testamentary disposition have been 
allowed to continue. 
 
South African testate succession has resulted in discrimination against 
women, as freedom of testation allows for systems of male dominance to 
continue. It allows for wealth to pass from one male to another. It has also 
allowed entrenched gender roles to continue by excluding women from 
inheriting. 
 
Thus the South African law of testate succession and its central concept of 
freedom of testation allows for discrimination on the ground of gender.9 
 
 1.2 Purpose of this study 
 
The South African concept of freedom of testation allows for discrimination on 
the ground of gender to continue despite this being a listed ground of unfair 
                                                 
7  Steinem Moving Beyond Words 175. 
8  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Hereinafter referred to as the 
Constitution. 
9  It is submitted that freedom of testation allows for discrimination on the grounds of 
both sex and gender, however the term gender will be used throughout the study 
but it is intended to refer to both forms of discrimination. 
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discrimination in the equality clause of the constitution.10 In light of the 
commitment to the new Constitutional dispensation freedom of testation, in its 
current form, may no longer be an acceptable form of succession. This study 
will consider how freedom of testation has resulted in discrimination against 
women and why such discrimination should no longer be allowed to continue. 
 
 1.3 Hypotheses 
 
This study has the following hypotheses for consideration in the cause of the 
argument: 
 
Freedom of testation in South African law is too broad. South African testators 
have too much freedom to do whatever they want with their property after they 
die. 
 
Freedom of testation is a memento of capitalist patriarchy. Freedom of 
testation supports and perpetuates capitalist patriarchy in that it allows for the 
continued ownership and control of wealth by men and as such for the 
continual exclusion of women. 
 
Freedom of testation in South African law is too broad and as it is a memento 
of capitalist patriarchy, it results in discrimination on the ground of gender. 
 
Freedom of testation should either only be allowed to continue under much 
more regulated conditions or should be done away with entirely. If freedom of 
testation were done away with it would result in all deceased estates 
devolving via the Intestate Succession Act.11 
 
                                                 
10 The Constitution, s 9(3):  „The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or 
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.‟ 
11  Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. Hereinafter referred to as the ISA. 
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 1.4 Assumptions and limitations 
 
It will be assumed that testators do discriminate in their wills and that 
discrimination is the whole point of testate succession. It has been suggested 
that testamentary discrimination is fairly common and can be found in many 
wills.12 This assumption is difficult to prove. Wills are considered to be private 
documents and therefore the content of a will is rarely public knowledge. Also 
the study can only look at the content of those wills which have come under 
judicial scrutiny. There may be many other wills which do discriminate on the 
basis of gender but which are never challenged in the courts and therefore 
are not reported on. Further, it is assumed that the majority of wills which have 
been drafted since 1993 (since discrimination on the ground of gender 
became unconstitutional) have not yet become actionable.13 When such wills 
do become actionable only a portion of them will be discriminatory and then 
only a portion of those discriminatory wills will come under judicial scrutiny. 
The BOE Trust Ltd No and others case provides one example of a will which 
was drafted within the new dispensation and still contained discriminatory 
terms. 14  So this assumption is not without any validation. 
 
The study will look at the Constitutional Court‟s view on equality. However this 
will be limited to the case of Harksen v Lane.15 A discussion of further equality 
jurisprudence would exceed the scope of this study. 
 
Due to the scope of the study any history before the Roman period, other than 
brief introductions on pre-Roman women and pre-Roman succession, will not 
be considered. 
 
                                                 
12  Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd 2006 (4) SA 205 [26] hereinafter referred to 
as Syfrets. 
13  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 hereinafter referred to 
as the Interim Constitution. 
14  BOE Trust Ltd No and others (211/09) [2009] ZAWCHC 88 (27 May 2009) (as yet 
unreported) hereinafter referred to as BOE.  
15  Harksen v Lane 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) hereinafter referred to as Harksen. 
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There will be no consideration of the differences in meaning between the 
terms „ownership‟, „possession‟, „control‟ of property and „property rights‟. For 
the purpose of this study what is essential is that women have been excluded 
from the ownership, possession, control of property and property rights. 
Generally this study will refer to ownership and control of property. However 
the term „property rights‟ will be used in discussions regarding rights. In the 
chapter on succession the term „ownership‟ is used. The study will not 
consider property in a separate chapter rather the study will deal with property 
as it arises in the chapters on Capitalism and Patriarchy. 
 
It is assumed that freedom of testation is protected, along with the institution 
of private succession, as part of the Constitutional right to property.16 Thus the 
property guarantee includes the right to dispose of property on death.17  
 
 The Constitution lists discrimination on the ground of gender as unfair 
discrimination.18 Therefore any discrimination on the ground of gender is 
unfair discrimination. It is assumed that discrimination on the ground of 
gender in the form of testate succession is unjustifiable. It is assumed that the 
right to equality cannot be limited by the right to freedom of testation.  
Conversely, although freedom of testation may be protected by the property 
clause in the Constitution19 it is assumed that this protection does not extend 
to the right to freedom of testation from being limited by the equality clause. 
 
                                                 
16  The Constitution, s25 (1).  
17  Corbett et all The Law of Succession in South Africa 47. Syfrets [18]. See also Du 
Toit “The Constitutionally bound dead hand? The impact of constitutional rights and 
principles on freedom of testation in South African law” 2001 (2) Stell 233 -234. 
However, there is no decisive commentary on this suggestion. Indeed Van Der Walt 
in his discussion of section 25 and what the property right guarantees does not 
include any discussion of succession rights. See Van Der Walt Constitutional 
Property Clauses 320 – 358. See also Van Der Walt The Constitutional Property 
Clause. 
18  The Constitution, s9 (3) 
19  The Constitution, s25. 
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This study is not going to address any gender discrimination that occurs in 
intestate succession or customary succession. It is suggested that such 
discrimination was dealt with in the case of Bhe.20 
 
The study will generally refer to testators as opposed to testatrices. It is 
considered irrelevant whether the testator is male or female, both genders are 
affected by capitalist patriarchy. What is relevant is that both testators and 
testatrices discriminate against women in their wills. 
 
 1.5 Point of Departure 
 
The purpose of this study is to undertake a historical and philosophical study 
of the concept of freedom of testation in order to prove that freedom of 
testation in South African law is a memento of capitalist patriarchy. The study 
will show that women have been excluded from the ownership, control and 
possession of wealth. As such, freedom of testation, in its current form, is no 
longer acceptable in the new South Africa. 
 
The point of departure of this study will be that of socialist feminism.21 The 
research will look at how women have been oppressed by patriarchy and 
capitalism, and how this oppression is embodied in freedom of testation. The 
research attempts to understand the ways in which freedom of testation has 
furthered the subordination of women. The study proposes that freedom of 
testation in South African law supports capitalist and patriarchal ideology. 
 
It will be argued that freedom of testation is a well-established capitalist 
ideology. Freedom of testation is used to ensure that wealth and the means of 
production are kept within the power of those who already possess wealth or 
already control the means of production (capitalists). It allows for the passing 
                                                 
20  Bhe Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and Others; SA 
Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the RSA and Another 2005 
(1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
21  The reasons for this point of departure will be explained below. 
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on of property from one capitalist to another. Thus the working classes are 
continually excluded from obtaining wealth or the control of the means of 
production. 
 
The concept also forms part of patriarchal ideology.22 The people who have 
wealth or the control of the means of production are, generally, male. 
Freedom of testation allows for the continuation of these patriarchal systems 
of dominance. Wealth or the control of the means of production can be 
passed from one male to another (usually from father to son).23 Thus the 
concept of freedom of testation allows for the continued exclusion of women.  
 
This study will begin with an explanation of the socialist feminist viewpoint. It 
will be followed by a study of the history of capitalism and the history of 
patriarchy and a consideration of how capitalism and patriarchy interact to 
oppress women. The discussion will continue with the history of freedom of 
testation. It will show that the concept of freedom of testation was created 
within the environment of capitalist patriarchy and that the concept is used to 
support capitalist patriarchy.  
 
The research paper will then conclude with a case discussion concerning 
freedom of testation in South African law. The research will show that the 
concept of freedom of testation in South African law is too broad and has 
allowed for, and continues to allow for, discrimination on the ground of gender 
as it is a product of capitalist patriarchy. The study will then propose a way 
forward for freedom of testation in South African law which will ensure that 
discrimination on the ground of gender is no longer possible. 
 
The main theme of the study is the intersection of theories pertaining to 
patriarchy, capitalism and property. 
 
                                                 
22  Steinem Moving Beyond Words 192. 
23  Bhasin What is Patriarchy? 9. 
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 1.6 Conclusion 
 
Freedom of testation is a memento of capitalist patriarchy. It allows for 
discrimination on the ground of gender to be perpetuated. As such women 
have been excluded from the ownership, control and possession of wealth. In 
light of this freedom of testation is no longer an acceptable method of 
succession in South African law and must either be done away with in its 
entirety or severely limited in its application. 
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2 Socialist Feminism 
 
The term Feminism has only been used since the nineteenth century although 
the intellectual history of feminism goes back to at least the fifteenth century. 
Feminism is a diverse field of study. Arguments for equality between the sexes 
can be traced far back in history.  Various feminist goals and arguments exist. 
Some feminists, sameness feminists, argue for equal treatment of the sexes, 
and some feminists argue for substantive equality between the sexes, others 
argue for different treatment of the sexes. This chapter will look at the socialist 
feminist branch of feminism.  
 
 2.1 The beginnings of feminism 
 
The feminist debate began with the liberal feminists arguments. Liberal 
feminist‟s most basic concern is for equality between the sexes. Put more 
broadly, liberal feminists are concerned for women‟s individualism, women‟s 
freedom of choice, equal rights and equal opportunities for women.1 Liberal 
feminists attempt to emancipate women from their oppressive gender roles.2 
 
The arguments of liberal feminism have been around for centuries, however 
one of the earliest and, arguably, most popular calls for equality came in the 
form of Mary Wollstonecraft‟s book, A Vindication of the Rights of Women.3 
Wollstonecraft‟s Vindication was published in 1792 and it brought the demand 
for female emancipation into mainstream political life.4  Wollstonecraft‟s book 
demanded the equal education of the sexes. Her argument was founded on 
females having the same capacity for rationality as males and therefore that 
                                                 
1  Gordon Transforming Capitalism and Patriarchy 13. 
2  Tong Feminist Thought 28. 
3  Wollstonecraft Mary A Vindication of the Rights of Women. 
4  Taylor Eve and the New Jerusalem 1. 
10  
women should receive the same education as males.5 Her argument was 
similar to, if not based on, Immanuel Kant‟s argument that in order to be a fully 
functioning human being one has to be able to act autonomously.6 For 
Wollstonecraft women‟s dignity was based on their capacity for self 
determination.7 This was the same capacity that Kant had argued for on 
behalf of men earlier in the eighteenth century. Wollstonecraft wanted women 
to be considered as what Kant termed an, „end‟ just as men had come to be 
treated as „ends‟ by Kant‟s arguments.8  
 
Kant‟s view on the capacity for self determination was the basis of the 
argument for human rights. It laid the groundwork on which human rights 
could be built. However these rights were always men‟s rights and 
Wollstonecraft made the argument for women‟s rights. Wollstonecraft argued 
that as women have the same capacity for rationality as men they should also 
be treated as persons and therefore should receive the same education as 
men. 
 
Wollstonecraft‟s argument was taken further in John Stuart Mill‟s “The 
Subjection of Women” and Harriet Taylor Mill‟s “Enfranchisement of Women”.9 
Mill‟s and Taylor Mill‟s essays extended the argument for women‟s equality to 
civil liberties and economic opportunities. They also suggested that women‟s 
inequality arose from society‟s customs and traditions.10 Mill and Taylor Mill 
provided the link between the calls for women‟s education and women‟s civil 
                                                 
5  Tong Feminist Thought 15. 
6  A discussion of Kant will be conducted later in the study. 
7  Tong Feminist Thought 16. 
8  Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 32 – 33. 
9  Mill “The Subjection of Women” in Rossi (ed) Essays on Sex Equality and Taylor 
Mill “Enfranchisement of Women” in Rossi (ed) Essays on Sex Equality. See also 
Tong Feminist Thought 2.  
10  Mill “The Subjection of Women” in Rossi (ed) Essays on Sex Equality 184 - 185 and 
Taylor Mill “Enfranchisement of Women” in Rossi (ed) Essays on Sex Equality 95. 
See also Tong Feminist Thought 2. 
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rights. Just as women had a right to education so they had rights to legal and 
social equality and the right to the vote.11 
 
Thus liberal feminists began the feminist movement by arguing for equality 
between the sexes based on sameness. However, the view of liberal 
feminist‟s is seen, by some, as moderate and consistent with liberal ideology 
and capitalist democracy.12 Liberal feminists do not question the patriarchal 
structures which exist in society to subordinate women.  Indeed some liberal 
feminists have accepted that their concepts of human values are in fact male 
values,13 that the concept of an autonomous person is fundamentally a male 
conception and cannot be applied to a feminist viewpoint.14  
 
Socialist feminists criticise the failure of liberal feminist to question the 
structures that exist in society to support the subordination of women. Liberal 
feminists do not question whether patriarchy is intrinsic to a capitalist system 
and vice versa. Thus liberal feminists pose no threat to the system of 
capitalism. 15 Liberal feminism does not recognise that equality cannot exist in 
a capitalist system as it ignores the structures of inequality, based on sex, 
which are intrinsic to capitalism.16  
 
 
 2.2 Socialist Feminism 
 
                                                 
11  Lerner The Creation of feminist Consciousness 217. 
12  Gordon Transforming Capitalism and Patriarchy 13. 
13  Tong Feminist Thought 28. 
14  Jagger Feminist Politics and Human Nature 28. For further discussion of this see 
West “Jurisprudence and Gender” in Barnett (ed) Sourcebook on Feminist 
Jurisprudence 227- 244. 
15  Gordon Transforming Capitalism and Patriarchy 14. 
16  Gordon Transforming Capitalism and Patriarchy 14. These structures of inequality 
will be discussed in the section on capitalism. 
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Modern socialism emerged in nineteenth century Europe in response to the 
rapid economic and social changes that had occurred with breakdown of the 
feudal order and the change from a rural economy to an urbanised, industrial 
economy. The resulting emphasis on individualism, liberalism and progress 
was interpreted differently by socialists than it was by capitalists. Socialism 
was a reaction to the lack of community and co-operation, the rise in poverty 
and inequality that became apparent with the rise of industrial capitalism.17  
 
The main concern of socialism is its commitment to creating an egalitarian 
society. Socialism‟s goal is to create a society where every person can seek 
fulfilment and is not held back by structural inequalities.18  
 
The most significant theory in the history of socialism, called Marxism, was 
produced by Karl Marx and Fredriech Engels.19 Marxism attempts to explain 
the progress of human society through class divisions and in the process 
provided a critique of capitalism.20 It is this critique which is relevant to 
socialism. 
 
Socialists argue that capitalism creates class divisions. Capitalism provides 
the upper classes with privileges and opportunities which are inherited from 
the ownership of capital and wealth. At the same time capitalism deprives 
those classes that have been historically deprived (the lower classes) of such 
capital and wealth. 21 Capitalism does not allow for equal access to resources 
or the means of production. Socialists understand that the majority of the 
means of production are owned by the minority (the upper classes) and yet 
                                                 
17  Newman Socialism: A Very Short Introduction 6. 
18  Newman Socialism: A Very Short Introduction 3. 
19  Newman Socialism: A Very Short Introduction 21. 
20  Marx Capital A Critique of Political Economy. See also Newman Socialism: A Very 
Short Introduction 22. 
21  Newman Socialism: A Very Short Introduction 3. 
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everyone depends on the means of production to live.22 Thus socialists 
challenge the property relationships that are fundamental to capitalism. 23  
 
For women, socialism offered a solution to the oppression and injustices 
caused by capitalism. Women were (and still are) subordinated by the 
structures of inequality, based on sex, which are intrinsic to capitalism. 
Socialism offered women a means of resistance and an alternative to 
capitalism.  
 
Socialist feminists propose that women are doubly disadvantaged in capitalist 
society as they suffer from economic and social dependence on men within 
the family and economic exploitation within the workforce.24 Socialist feminists 
believe that most property and the means of production are controlled by men 
and that they are passed from one man to another, usually from father to son 
via the system of primogeniture. Even in situations where a woman has been 
able to inherit property or the means of production, socialist feminists argue 
that she is limited by customary practices, emotional pressures, social 
sanctions, violence and gender roles, in her control over such property.25 
 
Socialist feminist thinking proposes that women‟s oppression appears in 
various ways and in various situations and not merely in the modes of 
production and the equality of resources. 26 They realise that a change in 
economic circumstances of women alone will not itself ensure that women are 
no longer subordinated to men. Socialist feminists propose that change is 
required in both the system of production and the ideology surrounding the 
                                                 
22  Ehrenreich “What is Socialist Feminism?” in Hennessy and Ingraham (eds) 
Materialist Feminism: A Reader in Class, Difference and Women’s Lives 65. 
23  Newman Socialism: A Very Short Introduction 3. 
24  Hannam Feminism 41. 
25  Bhasin What is Patriarchy? 9. 
26  Ehrenreich “What is Socialist Feminism?” in Hennessy and Ingraham (eds) 
Materialist Feminism: A Reader in Class, Difference and Women’s Lives 65. 
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subordination of women.27 Thus socialist feminists are concerned about the 
role patriarchy plays in the subordination of women as well as the role of 
capitalism.28 
 
Where socialist feminists differ from Marxists, or even from ordinary socialists, 
is that they believe that women were subordinated to men prior to 
capitalism.29 They suggest that patriarchy existed before capitalism. Socialist 
feminists suggest that women were subordinated to men before the 
development of class based societies thus their subordination has to have 
another cause not only the class division caused by capitalism and that this 
cause is patriarchy.30 Socialist feminists consider patriarchy to be a 
continually changing system and that the system of patriarchy has evolved to 
support capitalism. Conversely socialist feminists propose that to understand 
the subordination of women you have to understand the history of capitalism 
and therefore that capitalism developed to support patriarchy. 
 
Thus socialist feminists propose that women‟s oppression is a result of 
capitalist patriarchy, that the patriarchal privilege that men enjoy is as 
essential to women‟s oppression as the economic structure.31 They attempt to 
see the connection between the economic class and the sex class32 and the 
ways in which the intersection of patriarchy and capitalism help men to 
maintain power.33 
 
                                                 
27  Newman Socialism: A Very Short Introduction 95. 
28  For further discussion of socialist feminism see Eisenstein “Constructing a Theory of 
Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism” in Levine (ed) Enriching the 
Sociological Imagination 225 – 247. 
29  Rowbotham Woman's Consciousness, Man's World xxiiii. 
30  Beasley What is Feminism? An Introduction to Feminist Theory 62. 
31  Ehrenreich “What is Socialist Feminism?” in Hennessy and Ingraham (eds) 
Materialist Feminism: A Reader in Class, Difference and Women’s Lives 65. 
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  2.2.1 Capitalism and Patriarchy versus Capitalist  
   Patriarchy 
 
Some socialist feminists see capitalism and patriarchy as one system called 
capitalist patriarchy. Other socialist feminists see capitalism and patriarchy as 
independent systems (capitalism and patriarchy) linked by history. These 
socialist feminists think that capitalism is an expression of male dominance (of 
patriarchy). 34  
 
For the purpose of this study the argument that capitalism and patriarchy are 
linked is preferred or rather that capitalism is inseparable from patriarchy 
(patriarchy might still exist in a non-capitalist society). What is essential is that 
socialist feminists believe that capitalism and patriarchy or capitalist patriarchy 
is responsible for the subordination of women.  
 
The following chapters will look at how patriarchy and capitalism subordinate 
women and how they interact to support each other.  However it is very 
difficult to separate the two systems and at times it may appear that the study 
is discussing patriarchy under a capitalist heading or capitalism under the 
heading of patriarchy. Unfortunately this is the nature of the argument. Either 
capitalism and patriarchy have become so intertwined that it has become 
difficult to separate them, or they are in fact one system, capitalist patriarchy, 
and it is impossible to separate them. 
 
 2.3 Conclusion 
 
In order to understand how capitalist patriarchy has negatively affected the 
status of women it is necessary to look at the position of women throughout 
history. It is necessary first to understand, “the nature of female subordination, 
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the causes of women‟s co-operation in the process of their subordination and 
the conditions for their opposition to it”.35  
 
It is not possible in this study to consider the entire history of women‟s 
subordination as it was a process taking more than two and a half thousand 
years (and still continues).36 This study will consider both capitalism and 
patriarchy during the pre-Roman period with more in-depth studies of the 
Roman period and the Middle-Ages. This will be followed by a study of the 
Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the Reformation. The discussion on 
capitalism will conclude with the Industrial Revolution. The discussion on 
patriarchy will continue with the Industrial Revolution and into the 20th century.  
 
Whilst the argument has been made that patriarchy existed long before 
capitalism, the study will begin with a discussion of the history of capitalism. 
The history of capitalism is definite whereas the history of patriarchy has to be 
read into the history that has already been recorded by men. The history of 
capitalism sets the scene in this study for the history of patriarchy. 
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3 Capitalism 
 
 3.1 Introduction 
Discussing the origins of capitalism is a confusing and difficult task. Generally 
historians discuss what are considered to be the main characteristics to 
identify and date the origins of capitalism. These characteristics can include 
the nature of the economic system, ownership of property, methods of 
organising production, capital accumulation, the spirit of acquisitiveness and 
the growth of rationality.1  The culmination of these characteristics can be 
found in the English Industrial Revolution and the economic growth that 
resulted there from. 
The progress of capitalism towards the Industrial Revolution can be followed 
through the study of various historical developments. These developments 
came from the Renaissance and the Reformation; the rise of liberalism, the 
growth of individualism, political democracy and the growth of the market 
economy; the erosion of religious moral authority and the weakening of 
political monarchies.2  
The changes that occur in the characteristics of capitalism (for example the 
way ownership of property has been viewed over the centuries) are gradual 
and vague.3 This chapter is an attempt to discuss these characteristics 
through their historical developments. A combination of these characteristics 
together with the history of patriarchy will show that capitalism is a societal 
structure which has allowed for, and still allows for, the oppression of women.  
This chapter will start with a discussion of Roman law followed by a 
discussion of the feudal period. The study will consider changes that occurred 
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in the economy and (more importantly) with the way human beings viewed 
themselves and private property. The chapter will continue with a discussion 
of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the Reformation periods. The 
chapter will conclude with a discussion of the Industrial Revolution. 
 
 3.2 Roman Law 
 
It is generally agreed that in very early history possession was collective.4  
That property was owned by the whole of a community or tribe. There was no 
understanding of private ownership and therefore there could be no sale or 
exchange or donation.5  The trading of goods and trade routes did exist, 
however this exchange existed merely to provide for the exchange of goods 
for survival rather than for profit. 
By the third century AD Europe was dominated by the Roman Empire. 
Consequently the Roman view of ownership of property prevailed throughout 
Europe. However ownership in Roman law is difficult to define. The emphasis 
of Roman law was on possession of property as opposed to ownership of 
property.6 Although the Romans had a concept of a right to property, this right 
cannot be compared to the modern understanding of a subjective right to 
property.7  
In the Roman era ownership of property attached to a societal role as 
opposed to attaching to a person. A modern subjective right to property 
attaches to a person rather than to the role a person plays in society. In the 
Roman era ownership of property (or rather control of property) attached to 
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the role (or position) of the paterfamilias.8 The paterfamilias was the male 
person responsible for property on behalf of his family. 
 
The Roman law was not concerned with the justification of ownership. Roman 
society did not question the control over property that was exercised by the 
paterfamilias. The paterfamilas’ control of property was simply accepted as 
part of the social ordering of Roman society.9  
The concept of individualism was unknown in the Roman era. The concept of 
owning property as an individual was also unknown. This meant that Romans 
did not trade or participate in the market for profit or individual gain, rather 
they did so on behalf of the family and because that was the role they filled in 
society. The ideas of liberal capitalism had not yet developed. 
 
After the Roman period there was also no need for the justification of property 
as it was simply accepted as an established condition of life.10 However over 
the centuries as the ideology regarding ownership, or private property, 
changed it created a need for justification.11 
 
 3.3 Feudalism 
By the fifth century AD the destruction of the Western Roman Empire left the 
population of Western Europe without military protection or any form of social 
control. The population that remained consisted of small German kingdoms. 
The strongest and most resilient of these kingdoms were the Franks.12 
However the various kingdoms were frequently threatened by “barbarian” 
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invaders. In order to protect themselves from the threat of invasion by these 
“barbarian” invaders the Frankish kings devised a system of military and 
political relationships called feudalism.13 
The feudal system of the early Middle Ages was based on the Manorial 
system of the late Roman Empire.14 In the late Roman Empire manorialism 
consisted of large farms, called latifundia.15 These latifundia were in the 
possession of Roman nobles (Roman men who were the families‟ 
paterfamilias) and they became self-sufficient estates.  The servants who 
maintained the estate became bonded to the land.16 These estates provided 
for the subsistence of the households which lived on the land. A certain 
portion of the estate was reserved for the paterfamilias and his family, but was 
worked by the servants on their behalf. The rest of the land, whilst controlled 
by the paterfamilias, was divided amongst the slaves to support themselves.17  
Feudalism was a modification of the Roman Manorial system. Feudalism 
maintained the two class society of free men and slaves that existed in the 
Roman Empire. However, under feudalism the upper class (or nobility) 
consisted of those who had military skills and strength and could provide 
protection for the population from the “barbarian” invaders.18 Power and land 
became concentrated in the hands of those strong enough to protect 
themselves and their dependents.19  
The lower class, the serfs, were those members of the population who were 
not fighters but did the work necessary to support the military organization.20 
This class consisted of people who had been servants under the Roman 
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Empire and the common people of the Germanic tribes.21 The lower class 
worked the lands and provided produce and/or money payments to the noble 
class in return for their military protection.22  
Feudalism thus provided a new form of social system and provided military 
protection for the population of Western Europe. The serf was protected by 
the noble, who owed loyalty to and was protected by a higher noble who in 
turn owed loyalty to and was protected by the King.23 In return for their military 
service the Frankish Kings granted the nobles vast estates.24 The nobles 
granted hereditary rights to use a portion of land (a fief) to their serfs.25 The 
serfs sacrificed their liberty and became bonded to the land in return for the 
security provided by the nobles.26 Thus a person‟s standing in feudal society 
was decided by the amount of land they possessed.27 The more land under a 
noble‟s control, the more serfs he would have working for him and the higher 
up he was in the feudal hierarchy. 
Feudal society was controlled by men and was concerned with the affairs of 
men.28 A man‟s personal status was determined by his occupation, for 
example a man could be a knight, a baker or a mason. However a woman‟s 
personal status was defined by her gender, a woman could only be a virgin, a 
wife, a mother or a widow.29 Women were ranked and defined by who their 
fathers were or by the men to whom they were married and thus women were 
also part of the class divisions. However, noble or upper class women could 
not be valued for their military skills as they were not allowed to participate in 
the military. Women of the lower class could work for their nobles but their 
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roles depended upon that of their fathers or husbands. Even if women did do 
labour they were still expected to fulfil their domestic roles within the family. 
Thus during the feudal period men became valued for the military and labour 
role they could play in feudal society, whereas women became valued for 
their domestic roles. 
 
  3.3.1 The Role of the Church in feudal society 
The feudal system and consequently the property relations of the Middle Ages 
were justified by the Christian Church‟s paternalistic ethic.30 After the fall of 
the Western Roman Empire the Church became the most powerful authority 
in Europe. The Church controlled and produced all legal and political theory.31 
However in order to survive the invasions of the early Middle Ages the Church 
had to form a close relationship with the nobles in order to guarantee the 
Church‟s protection.32 Additionally the feudal lords needed an ideology that 
would justify the social system of feudalism.33 In order to justify the social 
system the Christian Church supported the feudal system through its 
theology.  
The theology of the early Middle Ages compared the society of Western 
Europe in the Middle Ages to a family. God was depicted as the father and 
humans as his children. As God cares for and protects his children so humans 
respect and give loyalty to God. This comparison was continued throughout 
the hierarchy. The role of the King was also compared to the role of the father, 
who looked after his subjects, and who was loved and respected by his 
subjects in return. Men who had wealth and power also had a role 
comparable to that of a father. The common person was supposed to submit 
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to the leadership of such men.34 The theology also ensured that women were 
subordinated to men. Women had duties of respect and loyalty to the men in 
their families and social system. 
This theology was emphasized in the New Testament which taught the 
importance of charity and caring for others as well as the evil of selfishness, 
greed and desire.35 Thus the wealthy and powerful had parental obligations 
towards the needy. In return the needy had duties of respect and loyalty 
towards those in power. The economic and social relationships of the feudal 
system came to seen as being ordained by God.36 
 
Apart from providing a justification for the new social system the Church was 
also involved in changing the opinions regarding private property. In the early 
Middle Ages the Church did not recognise private property as a right. The 
Church considered ownership of private property to be one of the 
consequences of the fall into sin.37 It was an example of corrupt society.38 
However the Church, as the largest possessor of land during the Middle 
Ages,39 had to accept the ownership of private property as a contemporary 
condition of everyday life.40  
 
Thus the original justifications for ownership came from theology. God had 
dominion over the earth and this resulted in man obtaining dominium over the 
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earth through God.41 The result was that private property became justified by 
natural law.42 
 
The Church had accepted and justified the existence of private property, and 
confirmed that common ownership was no longer the only form of ownership. 
However the justification for private property provided by early theology soon 
became unacceptable.   
As the ownership of property became more acceptable, it also became 
affected by the feudal hierarchy. Only the Church and the upper classes were 
able to own property. Serfs and women were certainly not seen to be capable 
of owning property. 
 
  3.3.2 Economic Revival 
During the early Middle Ages the economy was one of subsistent 
agriculture.43 Families consumed only what they themselves produced.44 The 
trade that existed was trade for survival rather than for profit. Whilst there 
were some merchants who bought and sold goods at a profit, the existence of 
a merchant class mostly disappeared due to the threat of attack from the 
barbarian invaders.45 The cities and towns that had existed in the Roman 
period were depopulated as people left for the countryside because of their 
fear of being attacked by the “barbarian” invaders in the cities and towns.46  
The small cities and towns which still existed were included in the feudal 
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hierarchy and had obligations to their feudal lords.47 Cities and towns became 
increasingly insignificant, except as religious centres and military fortresses. 
With the decline of trade in Western Europe, port cities lost their reasons for 
existence.48 Neither the small merchant group nor the agricultural labourers 
engaged in the production of goods for the market.49 The production of goods 
only occurred for personal use and local trade. The nature of the feudal 
economy and society was small-scale and inward-looking.50  
Though the ideas of individual liberalism were still coming, feudalism laid the 
groundwork for capitalism. It allowed for land and power to become 
concentrated in the hands of upper-class men. 
By the ninth and tenth centuries relative peace and stability returned to 
Western Europe and this laid the foundation for an economic revival.51 
Western Europe started to produce a small agricultural surplus which allowed 
for exchange to restart.52 Taxes started to be paid in money (as opposed to in 
kind) with the income received from the exchange of the agricultural surplus.53 
As the wealth of towns and cities increased due to the increase in trade they 
were able to purchase charters (from their rulers) which guaranteed the towns 
and cities freedom from the feudal hierarchy to regulate their own affairs.54 
The municipal and village authorities became responsible for the planning and 
regulation of economic life in towns and cities. To maintain social harmony all 
forms of production were regarded as a form of public service rather than as 
an act of increasing the wealth, prestige or power of an individual.55 
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  3.3.3 The further influence of the Church 
As commerce slowly started to grow it became necessary for the Church to 
have better justifications for private property ownership. These justifications 
for the Church were produced by Thomas Aquinas. Writing in the eleventh 
century Aquinas argued that even though private property is not ordained by 
divine law, justification can be found for it in natural law by using human 
reason.56 He argued further that private property contributes to the common 
good, because people take better care of property which they consider to be 
their own. He also stated that private property allows for the better 
organization of human affairs and that it creates a more suitable environment 
for peace.57 Thus Aquinas provided the first detailed justification for private 
ownership of property. The ownership of private property became justified by 
positive human law as an addition to natural law.58 
 
A further theological debate arising in the thirteenth century created a new 
need for a theological justification for private property. The need arose 
because of a debate between two scholastic orders in the Roman Catholic 
Church - the Dominicans and the Franciscans.59 The debate centred on 
whether the „ideal state of perfect human life‟ allowed for the ownership of 
property or whether it required a doctrine of poverty and thus denounced the 
ownership of property.60 Although the debate did not concern property rights 
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directly, the Dominican tradition of justifying material property and its 
ownership led to discussion about property rights.61  
 
This debate as well as Aquinas‟ arguments for private property created a 
significant change in the ideology surrounding private property. No longer was 
the justification for control of property based on membership of a group or a 
person‟s role in society (as was accepted in Roman times) but rather on 
man‟s relationship with God. The worldview was beginning to stress the 
importance of the individual.62  People stopped seeing themselves only as 
members of a group and began to see themselves as individuals.63 Emphasis 
began to be placed on the individual and the individuals rights. The 
justification for private property had changed from one‟s role in the family to a 
theological justification. 
Thus the control of private property became more socially and economically 
acceptable. Again the Church and its theology had a major influence on the 
changing perspectives on private property. 
 
  3.3.4 The later Middle Ages 
In the fourteenth century AD the population of Europe was decimated by the 
plague. The population decline created a huge labour shortage and thus the 
demand for labour grew and the wages that were offered for labour increased. 
The demand for labour meant that the lower classes no longer needed to be 
bonded to a certain estate in order to survive. Instead the lower classes had 
greater choice of whom they wanted to work for and where they wanted to 
work. Despite paying higher wages the upper classes also had to include 
other incentives to convince serfs to continue working their land. In order to 
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keep their current labour force and to encourage more serfs to work their 
lands the upper classes had to provide the serfs with better working and living 
conditions. By far the most important incentives that a noble could provide to 
encourage the lower classes to continue working their lands were those of 
freedom and choice.64 Nobles who offered these incentives kept the labourers 
for their lands. 
The small agricultural labour force now had far more power to enforce their 
rights.65 This resulted in the serfs gaining freedom from feudal dues and 
services66 and a great number of serfs became free tenants.67 The tenants 
would pay fees to the nobles for the right to live and work on the land. The 
tenants had the right to farm the land in whatever manner they wished and the 
produce from such land was their own.  
The result of the serfs being freed from their feudal dues and services created 
a market for land rentals.68 The majority of land still remained under the 
control of the upper classes. Lords became landlords. The nobles could now 
charge rent for the use of the land that had been under their military control. 
Rent in labour had been converted into rent in money.69 This allowed the 
upper classes to remain the upper classes because they were the majority 
land holders.70 Rent in the form of money allowed for the accumulation of 
private fortunes.71  
Competition among the lower classes for land increased the price of land 
rentals. Farming had to change from subsistence to intensive farming to 
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produce cash crops and make up for the high rent prices.72 This created 
pressure to use the latest technology and started the process of technological 
innovation.73 Innovative crops and practices increased the agricultural 
output.74 During this period the methods of production started to improve and 
specialisations started to occur.75 Advancements were made in the fields of 
transport, energy, textiles, metal work, agriculture and other consumer 
goods.76  
The enclosure movement of the late fifteenth century (continuing into the 
nineteenth century) also had a significant effect on the ownership and control 
of property.77  Most farming in the Middle Ages was based on an open field 
system. The open field system was co-operative, villagers decided together 
what crops to sow and the work of ploughing, sowing and harvesting the field 
was shared.78 The enclosure movement resulted in large areas of common 
land being fenced off and becoming the private property of individuals.79   
Enclosure occurred because there was a growing demand for wool and thus a 
need for grazing land.80 During the enclosure negotiations tenants would lose 
their right to farm because either their lease had run out, they were bought out 
by the larger landowners or because they simply were not able to prove any 
legal claim to the land.81 Land titles were very vague and tenants often 
ignorant, so enclosure could be easily accomplished by the more powerful 
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and educated landowner.82 From the 1700‟s onwards there was a growing 
tendency for landowners to use private acts of parliament to enforce 
enclosure.83 This often occurred without the knowledge of tenants living on 
the land.84 By 1830 almost all of England‟s agricultural land had been 
enclosed.85 
The enclosure movement separated the majority of the lower classes from the 
land on which they had subsisted.86 This created an agricultural proletariat 
who either became landless labourers working on the large estates for a wage 
or who went to seek work in the towns.87 The proletariat were a class of 
people who were emancipated from feudal duties but dependent on wage 
labour for their livelihood.88 
The dissolution of the feudal system, the change in status from serf to tenant, 
the enclosure movement and the consequent agricultural surplus resulted in 
less people being involved in subsistence farming and more people becoming 
involved in market activity.89 This growth in market activity led to urbanization 
and a consequent growth in towns and cities. 
 
However as the incidence of paid work increased so did the separation 
between paid work and domestic work. This separation between paid work 
and domestic work ensured that women were excluded from the paid 
economy.90 It also gave men a value for being able to earn money that 
women could not have. As women only performed domestic work the 
psychological value given to domestic work decreased and the psychological 
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value of paid work increased. Thus men became more valued as they were 
paid workers and the value of women decreased because they were not paid 
workers. 
 
The feudal period ensured that society was split into two definite classes, the 
upper and the lower, and that control (maybe not yet ownership) of property 
started to be accumulated by the upper class.  
 
 3.4 Renaissance and Enlightenment 
 
The fourteenth century was the beginning of the Renaissance period. The 
Renaissance was a period of transition between the medieval and the modern 
world.91 There was a revival of classical learning of the Greeks and Romans, 
the arts flourished and European society changed dramatically. The 
Renaissance period saw the conquest of Colonies around the world, the 
feudal political system turned into centralised monarchies, merchant 
capitalism grew, resulting in the expansion of manufacturing, and a rapid 
growth in population.92  Artists, architects and men of scientific and literary 
brilliance flourished during the Renaissance period. However the 
Renaissance was also a period of religious and political turmoil.93  
 
The Renaissance was intrinsically linked to the Scientific Revolution. 
Scientists returned to the study of nature by observation and experimentation 
and this laid the groundwork for all scientific work that has since been 
accomplished.94 In 1543 Copernicus proved that the sun was the centre of the 
universe and not the Earth as previously believed.95 This confirmed that the 
                                                 
91  Tanner The Renaissance and the Reformation 22. 
92  “Did gender have a renaissance” in Meade and Wiesner-Hanks (eds) A Companion 
to Gender History 343. 
93  Malone Women and Christianity Vol III: From Reformation to the 21st Century 11. 
94  Tanner The Renaissance and the Reformation 24. 
95  Tarnas The Passion of the Western Mind 416. 
32  
Earth revolved around the sun rather than the other way around. 96 The Earth 
was not the centre of the universe, merely one among a number of planets. 
 
This revelation had massive consequences for scholars during this period. 
Knowledge that had long been considered to be true had now been shown not 
to be. People had believed that human beings were the centre of the universe 
and this had been proved to be false. The basis of their belief system, their 
trust in religious theology, had been brought into doubt.97 This meant that the 
justification of private property provided by religious theology had also been 
brought into doubt. 
 
The scientific revolution required scholars to look at the world from a new 
perspective. European society began to develop a culture based on the ideas 
of personal liberty and rationalism. Medieval Europe came to be seen as, 
„primitive, superstitious, childish, unscientific and oppressive‟.98  New truths 
had to be found and new proofs for knowledge had to be provided. A new 
basis for their belief system was required in order to give it authority and in 
turn a new justification for ownership needed to be provided. Writers such as 
Rene Descartes, Hugo Grotius, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, and Georg 
Hegel were all influenced by these ideas and helped to change the way 
people thought about themselves, society, their place in society and 
consequently property and the economy.  
 
  3.4.1 Rene Descartes 
 
Rene Descartes was profoundly influenced by the scientific revolution. 
Descartes was disillusioned by the fact that ideas that he had believed to be 
true had been proved to be false, such as Copernicus proving that the sun, 
not the earth, was the centre of our universe. Descartes realised that the 
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direct evidence provided by our senses could in fact be false.99 Thus 
Descartes questioned whether there was any knowledge, any evidence 
provided by our senses, that could be proved to be true or could be known for 
sure. Descartes realised that something more basic, more trustworthy, than 
the evidence provided by our senses was needed to provide a sufficiently 
stable and acceptable basis for our knowledge.100 Descartes attempted to 
provide an incontestable foundation for science.101 
  
However, as it would be impossible to question the entirety of human 
knowledge Descartes decided to find proofs for the most fundamental 
questions, so Descartes began by doubting the existence of all reality. 102 He 
wanted to establish one unquestionable fact on which all other truths could be 
based.103 Whatever remains once doubt has been pushed to the limits of 
possibility must be the permanent basis of certainty.104 
 
Descartes found that there was no knowledge that could be proved to be true. 
The evidence provided to us by our senses might be false. All knowledge, he 
reasoned, had the possibility (however small it may be) of being false, as our 
senses may be deceived. However the one thing that Descartes found he 
could not doubt, the one thing that must be true, the one thing that could not 
be deceived, was the existence of his own doubting.105 Because Descartes 
could not doubt his own ability to doubt, he knew that this at least had to be 
true. Thus Descartes‟ famous statement, “cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I 
am)”,106 provided the only knowledge which could absolutely be true. 
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What Descartes achieved was to give identity to the „self‟ that thought.107 His 
statement created the idea that the human mind is separate from the human 
body.108 It presented the human mind, the self, the ability to think or to reason, 
as being the only true thing. Descartes presented a human being (or a self) as 
a totally separate, self-defining entity.109  
 
Descartes‟ theory had major theological consequences. His theory separated 
man from God. Now the existence of man could be proved without the 
existence of God. The existence of man could be proved by the human ability 
to doubt. Although Descartes went on to prove God‟s existence as a logical 
necessity for the existence of man (in fact man‟s existence proved the 
existence of God),110 he had essentially removed God from the equation.  
This discovery meant that the reliance on God for justification of private 
property was insufficient. With the rise of science the justification had to be 
based on scientific reasons as opposed to metaphysical ones.111 
 
  3.4.2 Hugo Grotius 
 
The Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, who wrote about the way to wage a just war, 
ended up providing a new justification for private property. 112  He also 
redefined the Roman concept of ius and thus created the concept of 
subjective rights. 
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Grotius (relying on Descartes) based his arguments on the power of human 
reason. He argued that society arises from a desire for human association, 
and from such association the idea of ius arises.113 Human reason tells us 
that in order for society to exist peacefully you have to respect the rights of 
others.114 
 
In Roman times an ius amounted to an action – a method or remedy which a 
person could use against another person to rectify a situation.115 Ius was a 
method of judgement.116 The term ius, although translatable to mean right, in 
practice amounted to an action.117 It was the power to act in a certain legal 
situation.118 Ius was not understood as the modern conception of a „right‟ is.  
 
Grotius subjectified the term ius so that it became something which a person 
has rather than an action that a person can use.119 To have an ius meant that 
a person had a moral quality which included power over oneself and power 
over others.120 An Ius became a power that a person has over other people to 
prevent them from interfering with one‟s self interest.121 
 
Then in an attempt to turn law into a legal science and provide a basis for a 
scientific legal methodology Grotius defined and labelled each right.122 Thus 
Grotius created the theory of subjective rights. Grotius proposed that 
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respecting individual rights would lead to less conflict and, in the event of a 
conflict, respecting individual rights would assist in an easy and swift 
resolution. This argument allowed for a doctrine of rights to become prominent 
in European society.123 Grotius‟ concept of ius eventually became the popular 
and accepted way of characterizing the way in which human beings behaved 
towards one another.124 
 
Included in Grotius‟ doctrine of rights was the right to private property, which 
Grotius justified by acquisition. All that was necessary to make oneself the 
owner of unowned property was an overt act of appropriation.125 
 
  3.4.3 John Locke and Immanuel Kant 
John Locke continued with Grotius‟ theory but focussed on the right to 
property. Locke justified a right to property by arguing that the fruits of one‟s 
labour were one‟s own.126 He suggested that we obtain a right to property 
because of the labour we invest in it and that this right allows us the freedom 
to do with the property what we will.127 
Locke‟s theory was satisfactory up to the eighteenth century. However as 
rights became more personal, and as individualism and liberalism grew, a new 
justification for private property emerged. The new justification came from the 
German philosopher Immanuel Kant who argued that private property was an 
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institution necessitated by practical reason.128 Kant suggests that the choice 
to acquire something as one‟s own and the obligation on others to refrain from 
using the objects of our possession is a rule of practical reason.129  
Kant provided a new foundation for knowledge, which had been Descartes 
original concern. Descartes had proposed that reason provided a foundation 
for knowledge.  Kant however realised that we cannot form any conception of 
the external world without using experience and thought which are subject 
dependent. Experience and thought Kant believed could not be trusted.  Kant 
realised that the causal connection between the experiment and the 
observation could not be validated either empirically or logically. Kant knew 
that experimentation and logic cannot be the only bases for reliable 
knowledge.130  In the process of creating a new theory of knowledge Kant 
redefined what it meant to be a rational human being.131  
 
Kant argued that human beings are not only physical bodies.132 Although it 
appears as if our bodies are controlled by the empirical world Kant asserts 
that there must be some aspect of our actions that is free, some aspect which 
is not controlled by the natural world.133  Kant makes this argument because 
as human beings we have moral concepts and categories. As human beings 
we are able to make moral decisions such as the choice between right and 
wrong or ought and ought not.134 As it is possible for us to choose our actions 
then there must be some part of us as human beings which is not controlled 
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by the natural world or subject to scientific laws.135 If human being‟s choices 
were only subject to scientific laws then they would, in fact, have no choice. 
 
Thus Kant argued that the part of a human being which exercises freedom of 
choice is not part of the empirical world. This freedom or moral autonomy 
gives human beings an absolute value; it requires that human beings always 
be considered as ends and never as a means to an end.136 
 
Kant claimed that this moral autonomy meant that human beings have the 
capacity for rationality and the capacity to generate and obey their own 
laws.137 And it is this ability to use their reason to make moral laws and to 
follow these laws that makes human beings unique.138 Human beings do not 
get their moral laws from others but instead find them within themselves.139 
For Kant human beings became the source of natural law. 140 
 
Kant then suggests that a legal system is created to protect this moral 
autonomy that human beings have.141 The legal system ensures that each 
human being has an external sphere in which their freedom, their autonomy, 
is protected from interference by others. From this idea rights are conceived 
as a negative moral space, protected by law, within which a person can 
realize and develop their individual moral freedom.142 For Kant the first right is 
the „independence from being constrained by another‟s choice‟.143 This first 
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right allows for the creation of other rights.144 Kant saw legal rules as a 
method for prescribing the way in which the free wills of individuals could 
coexist.145 
 
Kant argues further that ownership is acquired by the transcendental directing 
of an individual will upon a given object. A person needs to have an external 
sphere in which their moral autonomy, their freedom, can be expressed, and 
thus to create this external sphere ownership is required. Kant saw ownership 
as being the most significant way in which the human will can realise and 
objectify itself.146 Thus a new justification for ownership is provided by the 
human will. 
 
Kant‟s justification was furthered by Georg Hegel who reasoned that private 
property was an, „indispensible condition of human personality‟.147 Hegel put 
forward that property allowed human beings to be independent and free.148 
He suggested that a human being needs to have an external sphere, provided 
by property, in order to exist.149 Hegel‟s idea of a person was as a unit of free 
will or autonomy which had no concrete existence until there was an external 
world to enact such will upon.150 Property provides a social context in which a 
human being can be himself.151 Property allowed an individual to define 
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himself as separate from others.152 Thus by the early nineteenth century 
property had become an essential aspect to personality.153  
 
   3.4.4 Conclusion 
 
Thus the justification of private property had changed from the social order, to 
religious theology, to the rationality of man. Private property is now 
considered to be an expression of the individual and directly linked to the 
individual‟s will. 
What occurred during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment had massive 
consequences for how people viewed themselves. No longer did people see 
themselves as responsible to and for their superiors, rather they considered 
themselves as important as individuals. People‟s sense of responsibility to 
themselves and the property under their control changed.  
The general economic trend during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment 
periods was away from feudalism and towards capitalism. Trade, industry and 
the means of production started to become privately owned. The 
accumulation of private wealth, specifically of the upper classes, became 
more acceptable and more pronounced. The development of property rights 
assisted capitalism to attain its full potential.154 The creation of property rights 
allowed for the „instruments and appliances, structures and stocks of goods 
with which production is carried on‟,155 to be under the ownership of 
individuals. 
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 3.5 Reformation  
 
Another important aspect in the move towards capitalism was the 
Reformation. The Reformation began in 1517 when Martin Luther challenged 
the papacy about the sale of indulgences.156 The Reformation was a reaction 
to the Catholic Pope‟s abuse of power, the corrupt clergy and the deception of 
the common people by the Catholic Church. 157  
The essential feature of what became known as Protestantism is that the 
individual is given sole responsibility for their own salvation rather than an 
individual‟s salvation only being possible through the Catholic Church. 
Protestantism proposed that an individual‟s salvation is justified by their faith 
alone rather than by their works.158  Thus whether people were virtuous or 
evil, whether they were selfless or greedy became irrelevant to a person‟s 
salvation. Instead a person‟s salvation was determined by their belief and faith 
in God. 
The Reformation challenged the early Christian paternalist ethic which 
condemned greed, acquisition and the desire of wealth.159 Instead the 
Protestant belief encouraged a self-disciplined life and encouraged people to 
practice the occupation which, they claimed, God called people to perform.160 
It also fostered a belief that the salvation of an individual would be visible in 
an individual‟s success on earth. This is apparent in the adage, „God helps 
those who help themselves‟.161 These new ideas were supported by a dislike 
of selfish pleasure and frivolous spending, which encouraged people to save 
and accumulate private wealth. Protestantism encouraged people to practice 
their chosen (or God given) profession. It also encouraged and allowed 
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people to become prosperous from such professions as this was seen as a 
sign of God‟s approval. At the same time Protestantism discouraged the 
enjoyment of such prosperity. Therefore Protestants were encouraged to 
accumulate wealth but not to spend it. Thus the pursuit of commercial success 
became acceptable. The accumulation and the ownership of wealth were no 
longer frowned upon in society.162 
The emerging capitalists of the sixteenth century needed to be free from the 
moral opposition coming from the Catholic Church.163 It was here that 
Protestantism played a major role. Protestantism freed the emerging 
capitalists from the condemnation of the Catholic Church and paved the way 
for the accumulation of wealth and capital. 164 The value that Protestantism 
placed on performing one‟s work efficiently and successfully promoted 
economic labour and expansion.165 
This change in viewpoint promoted a new interest in individual choices and 
rights.166 Luther‟s doctrine of Christian liberty helped to promote freedom as a 
vital value of human existence.167 The ideas of individualism and rights 
created an economic vitality and promoted the accumulation of wealth.168 This 
led to a growth in trade and commerce169 and created a strong interest in 
property rights.170 
The Reformation also had a considerable influence on the doctrine of laissez-
faire. Laissez-faire, which literally means „let do‟, became the slogan of 
economic liberalism. The belief that moral and economic progress could only 
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come from an individual‟s self sacrifice and self discipline transformed into the 
concept of laissez-faire.171  
The concept of laissez-faire promoted the idea that if every man were allowed 
to pursue his own self interest, then society would benefit from the increased 
prosperity.172 This was also influenced by the individualist ideals of John 
Locke and David Hume,173 who proposed that if people are free from 
government intervention to pursue their own ends they are more likely to be 
prosperous and that this would prevent discord in society and the economy.174 
Thus, especially in Britain the policy of laissez-faire was seen as being a 
natural expression of liberty and harmony.175 By the early twentieth century 
this policy of no state intervention in economic affairs became widely 
accepted. 
The Reformation combined with the ideas of the Renaissance and 
Enlightenment periods allowed for and promoted the accumulation of wealth 
under the ownership of the minority. It created an environment in which it was 
more acceptable and set the stage for the massive changes that occurred in 
society during the Industrial Revolution.  
 
 3.6 Industrial Revolution 
 
By the sixteenth century the population had recovered from the effects of the 
plague, commerce started to grow dramatically and there was a greater need 
for manufactured goods. The intellectual development of the sixteenth century 
also led to new scientific advancements.176  
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From the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries onwards there were important 
advances in transport, energy, the production of textiles and other consumer 
goods, metalwork and agriculture.177 The advancements made in navigation, 
created a greater availability of raw materials and introduced better ways to 
use the raw materials. There was development in all sectors of the economy 
which brought about a rise in production.178 The improvements and changes 
in technology allowed for the performance of tasks that had taken far more 
time in the pre-industrial period or that may not have been performed at all.179 
These advancements were very influential in the transition to capitalism.180 
Due to the technological advances (especially in the area of medical science) 
there was an increase in the population.181 The rise in population created a 
greater demand for manufactured goods and raw materials. This resulted in 
the „putting out system‟ whereby capitalists owned the goods through all the 
stages of production. The capitalist owned the raw materials and the products 
manufactured from such raw materials.  The craftsman or worker no longer 
owned the finished product and could no longer sell the finished product to 
earn a living. Instead of selling a finished product the craftsman sold his talent 
or abilities in the form of labour to the capitalist.182 The craftsman now earned 
his living through wage work. 
The fact that the capitalist could own the product throughout all stages of 
production was as a result of the changing ideologies. The changing 
ideologies were also as a result of a need for the justification of private 
property that came from the emerging capitalists. Such justification was 
provided by the Enlightenment philosophers. It is suggested that the changing 
ideologies may have been self-serving. 
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As technology improved there was rapid development of factories and 
equipment.183 The economy came to be dominated by mass-industry and 
overseas trade.184 Production no longer occurred in the home of the 
craftsman but rather occurred in factories. Production stopped being an 
individual venture and became a team process. Production no longer 
occurred by hand but rather became largely produced by tools and 
machines.185 This created a greater market and demand for manufactured 
items. 
From the middle of the nineteenth century capitalism grew to become the 
dominant form of production throughout the world.186 And today the majority of 
capital and the means of production are owned by the minority. 
However despite these advances in society, the divisions in class became 
even more apparent during the Industrial Revolution. The differences between 
landless wage earners and capital owning entrepreneurs became increasingly 
significant.187 The methods by which people earned their livelihoods had 
changed, and the landless became progressively more dependent on 
employment.188 The division between landed and landless and the 
consequent dependence on wage earning created an urban middle working 
class of people.189  
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 3.7  Conclusion 
 
The development of capitalism arose from a change in the structure of 
society, a change in the way human beings viewed themselves and a change 
in the views regarding the ownership of private property. The result has been 
that the majority of wealth and the control of the means of production are now 
owned by the minority.
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4 Patriarchy 
 
 4.1 Introduction 
 
Patriarchy generally describes male domination. It concerns the power 
relationships by which men dominate women and the systems which make 
women subordinate to men. Patriarchy is founded by the ideology that women 
are inferior to men. 
 
The subordination of women occurs in different forms in all aspects of life. It 
occurs within the family, within the work environment and in the social 
environment. The norms and practices which define men as superior and 
women as inferior are present in our family lives, social lives, religious lives, 
laws, schools, books, media and work environments. Throughout history men 
have been identified with having a higher value as a human being than 
women have.1 Patriarchy creates the standard that male is normal and that 
the male point of view is the human point of view.2 
 
Patriarchy creates and supports a system of male control, male dominance 
and male superiority. Each period of history, each social system is subject to 
patriarchy.3 Patriarchy has created the institutionalised subordination and 
exploitation of women by men.4 In most circumstances women form part of 
the system of patriarchy as they have internalised it.5 Women have become 
integral to upholding and perpetuating the power of patriarchy. “The 
systematic disadvantaging of women has affected women‟s self-perception, 
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their ability to conceptualize their own situation and their ability to conceive of 
societal solutions to improve it.”6  
 
Each period of history that is examined should be viewed as being affected by 
and subject to patriarchy. 
 
As previously stated the enquiry into patriarchy will focus on women during 
the pre-Roman period, the Roman period and the Middle Ages. Then the 
study will focus on the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the Reformation; 
and the Industrial Revolution.   
 
 4.2 Pre-Roman Women 
 
It is suggested that long before the Roman period women were already 
subject to the control and domination of patriarchy. Friedrich Engels suggests 
that patriarchy occurred because of the domestication and propagating of 
animals, which was first serious division of labour between the sexes.7 Engels 
suggests that from this division of labour arose the division of society into 
classes8 and the inequality between the sexes.9 When animals became 
domesticated it created a market for animals. Men, as the people responsible 
for the animals were able to participate in the market but women were 
excluded from participating in the market. From this very early stage women 
were excluded from the control of private property (which at this point in 
history was animals) and relegated to the domestic sphere.10  
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Engels suggests that the domestication of animals excluded women from 
production and restricted women to their domestic role.11 Gerda Lerner also 
suggests that the development of agriculture during the Neolithic period led to 
the commodification of women‟s sexual and reproductive capacities. Women 
came to be seen as a resource for labour and accumulation. Lerner further 
argues that as a consequence of this women (and their sexual and 
reproductive capacities) came to be treated as a means of exchange.12 
Women could be bought or sold in marriage for the benefit of their families.13 
Pre-Roman society was structured in a manner whereby women were 
exchanged in marriage and whereby men had certain rights in women which 
women did not have in men.14 Pre-Roman women, as a group, had less 
autonomy than men.15  Women, at this early stage of history, were a resource 
which men could acquire.16 
 
Thus even in the pre-Roman period woman became physically and, more 
importantly, psychologically subordinate to men. 
 
There is another view which proposes that prior to patriarchy (or recorded 
history) the world was matriarchal. The argument suggests that prior to 
patriarchy women were respected. Women were the powerful gender in 
society and held the leading positions in society.17  Friedrich Engels suggests 
that women, as the only certain parent of children, received respect, 
deference and tribute. He suggests that all the nations of antiquity were ruled 
by maternal law.18  
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Whichever model is correct, whether patriarchy has been in existence since 
human beings have been in existence or whether there was a period of 
human history when women were considered the more important of the sexes 
cannot yet be decided. However, it is certain that by the Roman period 
patriarchy had taken hold. 
 
 4.3 Roman Women 
 
As early as the tenth century BC Roman society was patriarchal. Roman 
domestic life, social life, political life and economic life was male orientated 
and male dominated.19  
 
Under early Roman law a woman‟s role was restricted to the bearing of 
children and the management of the family household.20 It was assumed that 
women wanted to be married and have children and thus women did not have 
the option of a career or a profession.21  
 
Women in Roman society were valued for their roles as wives and mothers.22 
Women were considered to be at a physical disadvantage because of their 
lack of strength and because of their ability to bear children.23 Roman society 
believed that the female sex was suited to domesticity.24  Thus Roman 
women were (and consequently were also considered to be) less educated, 
less experienced, emotionally vulnerable and dependent on their male 
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relatives.25 These perceived weaknesses convinced Roman society into 
believing that women were intended to stay in the home.26 
 
A Roman woman was expected to subject all of her own interests to those of 
the men in her life.27 A Roman female was subject to the control of her 
paterfamilias. The paterfamilias could be her father, her oldest male relative, 
her husband or her husband‟s paterfamilias.28 Roman women were not 
allowed to assume a public role.29 Women were excluded from office and 
were not allowed to vote.30  
 
Women in Roman times were also limited in terms of ownership of property. 
As previously stated ownership in Roman law is difficult to define, but it is 
generally thought that property was controlled by the paterfamilias (the male 
head of the family). The paterfamilias controlled the property on behalf of the 
family and he had a responsibility to control the property in the best interests 
of the family and the property. The property continually belonged to the family 
rather than the paterfamilias. When the paterfamilias died a new paterfamilias 
would take over his position and inherit the property on behalf of the family. 
Whilst there is little evidence of primogeniture in Roman law there are records 
of patrimonial estates remaining within a family line for several generations.31  
Thus the system of succession in Roman law was developed in such a way as 
to exclude women from the control of property. 
 
The Roman marital regime also ensured that women were excluded from the 
control of property. When a woman married cum manu under Roman law she 
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moved from the potestas of her father to the potestas of her husband (or her 
husband‟s paterfamilias). In early Roman law an uxor in manu (a wife who 
was married in manu) and the children of a paterfamilias were not allowed to 
own property at all.32 Any property that a woman held before a marriage in 
manu became the property of her new paterfamilias.33  
 
A woman who married sine manu remained within the control of her original 
family and therefore under the patria potestas of her paterfamilias.34 Thus any 
property she may have had remained under the control of her paterfamilias. 
The cum manu form of marriage became outdated in the post classical period, 
instead marriage sine manu became the norm.35 This meant that a woman did 
not move into the control of her husband‟s family, instead she stayed within 
the patria potestas of her own paterfamilias. Whichever the form of marriage, 
it is clear that property always remained within the control of men.  
 
It is generally agreed that the life expectancy in Roman times was between 
twenty to thirty years.36 Usually females would be married by the age of 
sixteen or at least by their early twenties.37 Thus it was highly probable that a 
woman would pass from the patria potestas of her father to the manus of her 
husband.  
 
 However, it was possible for a Roman woman to become sui iuris 
(independent).38 This would happen if her paterfamilias died before she 
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married in manu or if she were emancipated. However a woman who was no 
longer under patria potestas, nor married in manu was still required in early 
Roman law to have a guardian.39 This requirement was called tutela 
mulierum. The guardian would generally be her nearest agnatic male relative, 
unless another person was appointed on her behalf in the will of her deceased 
paterfamilias.40 This provision ensured that should a woman come into the 
control of any property, she could be prevented from disposing of such 
property and that the property was kept intact for future male generations.41 If 
a Roman woman came into the control of any property she could not marry, 
nor could she alienate any of her property, nor could she make a testament to 
dispose of it after her death without her guardian‟s consent.42 Thus the 
property was hers in name only and the property was really under the control 
of her male guardian.43 However by the post classical period this tutela 
mulierum had become ineffectual.44 
 
By the mid first century AD the legal restrictions which had prevented women 
from participating in commercial activities had been removed or had become 
ineffective.45 In matters of private law it was considered that women had 
achieved something near equality.46  
 
However it is generally agreed that despite these changes the majority of 
Roman women were socially conditioned not to participate in commercial 
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enterprises.47 Women still played no part in government or in public law. 
Social conventions and economic circumstances meant that women were still 
subordinate to men.48 Women were considered to belong to the private 
sphere of life and were expected to fulfil their natural role of submission and 
obedience.49  
 
By the end of the Roman period patriarchy was already established as 
property was controlled by the paterfamilias and the social restrictions placed 
on women ensured that they had very little access to or control over property. 
The emphasis on women‟s domestic role and their lack of education meant 
that from the early beginnings of recorded history women were intellectually 
and economically disadvantaged and prohibited from participating. 
 
Towards the end of the Western Roman Empire the growing belief in 
Christianity seemed to offer women an escape from patriarchal Roman 
society. 
 
 4.4 Christian Women 
 
Towards the end of the Roman Empire Christianity became the emerging 
religion of the era. Women were drawn to the new religion because they were 
able to share in the activities and ideals of the new Christian religion.50  
 
The teachings of Jesus focused on removing social discrimination. His 
teachings challenged the arrangement of the biological family and the 
arrangement of the patriarchal marriage.51 Jesus‟ teachings challenged 
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women‟s subordination in society and within the family. This had significance 
for women as it offered women freedoms which they had not previously 
enjoyed.52  
 
The characteristics most associated with women, such as child bearing, 
mercy and compassion, were celebrated in the early Christian religion.53 
However Jesus also offered women the option of not getting married.54 Early 
Christianity allowed women to become involved in the public sphere.55 Every 
person was equal in the eyes of the Christian God.56 The early Christian 
religion allowed for the creation of a new society in which men and women 
were equals.57 
 
The writings of Paul however changed these ideas. Paul reconstructed the 
teachings of Jesus so that the gender and social implications were lost. Paul 
reverted to the hierarchal order of creation wherein men were supreme and 
women subordinate.58  
 
As Christianity grew larger it became more conservative and the Roman 
society‟s domestic role of women was revived.59 God was the head of Christ, 
Christ the head of man and man the head of woman.60 This (conveniently) 
supported the Church‟s ideology as God was the head of the Church, the 
Church the head of men and men the head of the family. 
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This change in Christianity was continued and extended in the generations 
after Paul. In the first two centuries AD the ecclesiastical reforms which were 
implemented ensured that women had little role to play in Christianity.61 By 
the first half of the second century women were prohibited from teaching in 
the Church or holding any authority in the church.62  
 
These reforms started to have a social influence on the family hierarchy. 
Women were again required to submit to their husbands.63 As in early Roman 
times, women became defined by their bodies and its utility. Women became 
bound by a number of constraints and were rarely seen as individuals in a 
legal, moral or economic sense.64 
 
Although essentially Christian teaching was that everyone is equal, regardless 
of gender, in the eyes of God, the reality was that women were not treated as 
equals.65 The Church regarded women as being the descendants of Eve and 
therefore as being intellectually and emotionally inferior to men. This religious 
argument allowed for women to be prevented from participating fully in the 
Military and the Guilds. The argument also had the dreadful consequence that 
women did not need to be educated to the same level as men.66 
 
However the promise of equality between the sexes in the afterlife was still 
attractive to women and thus the religion was still popular and it continued to 
grow throughout the Middle Ages.67 
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 4.5 Feudal Women 
 
Pre-feudal society following Roman society was unquestionably biased 
towards men. Originally in the feudal period a person‟s standing in society 
was decided by the amount of land they possessed and land possession was 
related to military service.68 However as women could not perform military 
service they were excluded from the feudal system. The connection between 
land-holding and military service meant that women were further prevented 
from landholding.69  
 
Feudal estates were usually transferred from one male heir to the next.70 So 
women were continuously prevented from possessing and controlling 
property. If the family had no sons then it was possible that a daughter would 
succeed to the estate.71 However women were still subject to the 
guardianship of men and therefore the succession was in name only. A 
woman (who was not married) who had succeeded to property was usually 
under the guardianship of her nearest male relative, or of her lord or king.72 
Thus the control of property still lay in the hands of men. 
 
Marriage in medieval society also upheld patriarchal thinking. Women were 
encouraged to marry and it was uncommon for a woman to be unmarried.73 
When a woman married she would pass from the control of her father to the 
control of her husband, just as women had in the Roman period. Feudal 
women were expected to subordinate themselves to fathers or to their 
husbands, in all areas of their lives.74 Should a woman have obtained the 
control of some property, upon the conclusion of a marriage such property 
                                                 
68  Harksen Women in the Middle Ages 9. 
69  Gies Women in the Middle Ages 27. 
70  Gies Women in the Middle Ages 27. 
71  Harksen Women in the Middle Ages 9. 
72  Gies Women in the Middle Ages 29. 
73  Shanar The Fourth Estate 65. 
74  Shanar The Fourth Estate 14. 
58  
would pass from the control of the wife to the control of her husband. This 
included any land and the income arising from such land. The only restriction 
placed upon the husband was that he could not dispose of the land without 
his wife‟s consent. However, this restriction was easily circumvented.75 If a 
woman succeeded to any property from her family, such property was 
regarded as being jointly shared by the woman and her husband and the 
husband bore the responsibility of managing the joint assets.76 Women were 
also not allowed to dispose of their property via a will and her property would 
pass automatically to her surviving male heir.77 
 
A woman‟s economic influence in medieval society was restricted to the 
household. Women were only given control over small sums of money for the 
running of the household.78 This limited power was given to women more for 
convenience sake than because women were allowed to hold authority in 
feudal society.79 It was convenient that women were responsible for baking, 
brewing, caring for the yard animals and the cultivation of the land 
immediately surrounding the homestead.80 As women were only given control 
over small sums of money they were prevented from any involvement in the 
market. Men were relieved of all the domestic responsibilities. This meant that 
men were able to perform tasks outside the household. 
 
During the feudal period women still had no participation in government.81 
Women could not represent themselves in court and they had no legal 
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capacity.82 This restricted women from forming economic acquaintances and 
from acquiring political influence.83 Women could be included within the 
guilds, but this was more of a preventative measure, ensuring they did not 
compete in the market.84 Thus women‟s participation in the guilds was 
nominal. 
 
Some writers have argued that women did enjoy a level of social, political and 
economic equality during the feudal period. Indeed guardianship of women 
died out towards then end of the Middle Ages.  Some women were able to 
hold land and to represent themselves in court.85 However this level of 
equality was conditional to the unwritten assumption that women would not 
abuse this power.86 
 
Women‟s continued lack of or lesser education, the lack of control of property 
and their continued limitation to the domestic sphere ensured that women 
continued to be subordinate to men. 
 
 4.6 Women of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment 
 
The Renaissance period saw many drastic changes in Western Europe. 
Colonies were established around the world, the fragmented political system 
that characterised feudalism became centralised monarchies, economies saw 
large scale changes as merchant capitalism grew, manufacturing expanded, 
populations grew and more people moved into towns and cities.87  The 
Renaissance experienced a wealth of artists, architects and men of scientific 
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and literary brilliance, however it was also a period of religious and political 
turbulence.88 
 
The codification of procedures regulating commerce, trade and market 
relations restricted the activities of women in ways which they had not been 
during the feudal period.89 It appears that over the course of the Renaissance 
women had gradually less legal control over property.90 The revival of Roman 
law in the Renaissance ensured that women were again understood as being 
incapable. Women were again subjected to the control of a male guardian, 
they were prevented from succeeding to land (this had a limiting effect on 
their already restricted political roles) and women were still excluded from 
voting or holding political office.91 
 
During the Renaissance, scientists and writers produced an energetic 
intellectual environment.92 Scientists returned to the scientific methods of 
observation and experimentation. This laid the groundwork for Copernicus‟s 
astronomical discoveries and the scientific revolution.93 The scientific 
revolution had dramatic consequences for man‟s position in society. 
 
The new knowledge that came with the scientific revolution brought about an 
increase in self-esteem and recognition of the dignity of man. The 
Renaissance period saw an increased interest in the individuality of human 
beings.94 The individual became important as an individual, not because they 
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were a member of a guild or corporation or because of their status in 
society.95 However these changes were limited to the male human being.96 
 
The renewed interest in science led to a new understanding of biology and 
thus a new understanding of the social and political formulations of gender 
roles.97 A correlation was drawn between men‟s and women‟s different 
biologies and their, "naturally” different roles and abilities. Increasingly gender 
became a key determinant of power.98 
 
Because of the renewed interest in science and man‟s position in society 
philosophers started questioning man‟s existence, and as a result forming a 
system of human rights. However their discourse concerned men as opposed 
to women.99 Most philosophers assumed that if women had the ability to 
reason then such ability was more concrete and less abstract than man‟s 
ability to reason100 and thus inferior.101 Generally though, women‟s inferiority 
was justified on the natural ground of their sex.102 Most writers maintained 
physical and intellectual distinctions between the sexes.103 Some writers‟ 
theories, such as Descartes‟, were accessible to men and women. Descartes 
thought that both men and women had the capacity for reason and the 
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potential to exercise it. However the reality of the lives of women prevented 
women from realising this potential.104 
 
The Renaissance era did produce some literature in defence of women. A 
debate was initiated by Christine de Pizan around 1400 AD.  Christine de 
Pizan was France‟s first professional female author. De Pizan‟s family 
circumstances forced her to write in order to support herself and her family. As 
a female writer in the fifteenth century it was first necessary for de Pizan to 
prove that women could and should write. This required de Pizan to challenge 
centuries of philosophical and theological thought regarding women.105  De 
Pizan argued that women‟s faults come from their secondary status and lack 
of education as opposed to their inherent natures.106 
 
However despite de Pizan‟s argument, women were generally thought to be 
inferior. Because of this women were excluded from the arguments for human 
rights and therefore also excluded from the arguments for political rights.107 
 
This assumed inferiority justified the continued substandard education of 
women.108 It was argued that as women had an inferior ability to reason they 
should not be burdened with other concerns and therefore their role should be 
limited to the domestic sphere.109 Their education should only be carried out 
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to the extent that they are required to fulfil their natural duties110 of wife and 
mother.111 
 
Thus in Renaissance Europe the education of women was minimal and it was 
used to reinforce societal and religious restraints on their behaviour. From the 
sixteenth century onwards much of the focus on gaining equality for women 
was on ensuring access to education for women.112 Prior to the seventeenth 
century women only received above standard education if they were a 
daughter of wealth or rank, a daughter in a family which had no sons, or if her 
father had enlightened ideas about female education.113  
 
By the seventeenth century, discussion regarding the equality of the sexes 
had become common among educated Europeans.114 Seventeenth century 
feminism questioned the idea of a fixed nature for women and men.115 The 
idea that gender differences might be a result of social and cultural 
conditioning rather than biological reasons allowed for the questioning of the 
traditional roles of men and women.116 However these liberal arguments for 
equality were not intended to change the culture of male domination merely to 
allow for women to participate in that culture.117 
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The Renaissance may not have changed the reality of women living during 
that period, but the ideas of Enlightenment philosophers about, „tolerance, 
reason, progress, natural rights, freedom, education and personal fulfilment, 
laid the groundwork for the feminist revolution.118 
 
Ideas about individuality and human rights led to an analysis of the role of 
women and the promotion of their equal rights. Importantly education for 
women started to become more popular.119  
 
 4.7 Reformation Women 
 
The scientific revolution and the spirit of enquiry which began in the 
Renaissance allowed more serious questions concerning religious and moral 
life to be asked.120 This resulted in the Renaissance leading to the 
Reformation. 
 
Protestant Reformers originally seemed to offer women more opportunities 
and status than the medieval Catholic Church had.121 Protestants emphasized 
the spiritual equality between men and women. Within the new religion some 
women found social recognition and personal autonomy. For a brief period 
some women were able to challenge the stereotypical assumptions about 
women.122 However the pressure to conform to the existing norms of society 
prevented women from gaining too much equality.123  
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The protestant faith placed extreme importance on the household and on 
family life. This confirmed women‟s subordinate position within the Protestant 
religion. The only acceptable role for a Protestant woman was that of wife and 
mother.124 Women were pressured into getting married. The role of wife came 
to be seen as a woman‟s highest calling. Protestants required women to serve 
God by getting married and fulfilling the role of wife.125  Thus, whilst 
Protestants praised women and their virtues they still ensured that women 
were subordinate to men.126  
 
The Protestant revolt against the imposed celibacy of the Catholic Church 
meant that monasteries and convents were closed down.127 This meant that 
some women lost the option of a religious vocation.128 No longer was the role 
of Nun available to women. The closing of convents also greatly decreased 
the educational opportunities for women. However, the protestant emphasis 
on bible reading created a need for the education of both males and 
females.129 Protestants did open schools which allowed for the education of 
females, however, the education was limited to the reading of the bible, the 
teaching of the catechism and basic literacy. Protestant education also 
focused on a female‟s domestic duties. 130 
 
At the same time as the Protestant Reformation Catholics also began to 
emphasize the importance of domestic life. Both Protestant and Catholic 
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religions started to limit the definition of a good wife, so that women were 
increasingly limited to the domestic arena.131 
 
The hierarchal society continued to be dominant. The well-ordered family 
dominated by the father had become the model for the well-ordered state and 
in turn the well-ordered state reinforced the hierarchy within the family.132 
 
However the Protestant Reformation also initiated a multitude of extremist 
religions which went even further in the battle for equality of the sexes. These 
religions sometimes advocated free love and complete freedom for females. 
Some attacked the patriarchal institution of marriage. Some of the new 
religions allowed women to take leading roles within their organisations.133  
 
The period of Renaissance and Reformation had allowed the role and nature 
of women to be questioned and many philosophers had given attention to the 
role of women, marriage and the family. However due to their lack of 
education few women had been able to participate in these debates. The 
reformation did create some opportunities for change but they were rare. 
Nonetheless the Enlightenment had provided women with the means to begin 
the debate.134  
 
 4.8 Industrial Revolution Women 
 
 At the beginning of the nineteenth century women did not have the right to 
vote, women could not run for election or hold any public office, they could not 
be a member of a political organisation or go to political meetings. Women 
were constrained economically. Women could not participate in trade, open a 
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business, start a profession, open a bank account or obtain credit in their own 
names. They could not own property, any property they inherited135 passed to 
their husbands on marriage. Women remained under the power and control of 
their father until they married and when they did such power and control 
passed to their husbands. Women were still seen as minors in terms of the 
law; they were not considered to be legal persons and could not enter into 
contracts on their own. Women were still discriminated against in terms of 
inferior education. The sanctity of the family and the cult of domesticity were 
regarded as fundamental social values in the nineteenth century. 136 
 
Under the feudal regime, though a woman was subordinate, her work still had 
an economic value for the family. This contribution had given women a certain 
position and a limited power within the family.137 However with urbanization 
and industrialisation work started to be performed outside the family home. 
This meant that women were increasingly excluded from the world of 
business.138 When women had children they became even more economically 
dependent on men as they were further prevented from participating in the 
economy because of their child rearing duties.139 Their roles became limited to 
the raising of children and the performance of domestic work. When women 
did work their employment was seen as marginal. This was used as a 
justification for lower wages for women which, in turn, reinforced the belief that 
a women‟s place was in the home.140  
 
The Industrial Revolution saw a mass urbanisation throughout Europe (and 
America). This led to massive changes in the social structure of society and 
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particularly changes in the structure of the family.141  Capitalism replaced 
human labour with machines.142 Certain family members (specifically the 
housewife) became robbed of their productive function as certain goods (such 
as food and clothes) started to be purchased outside of the family. This meant 
that certain family members were unproductive and had to find new ways to 
support themselves and their dependent family members.143 
 
As a woman was seen as destined to get married and have children, it implied 
that only young unmarried women could participate in the workplace. This 
also implied that as these young women had no family responsibilities they 
only needed to be paid enough to support themselves. This created a 
difference in the value placed on men and women‟s work. It also implied that 
as a woman‟s working life was limited to the time until she got married, it was 
unnecessary to train her for a lifetime‟s work.144 
 
By the 1830‟s the requirements of industrialising societies significantly 
changed the importance attached to girl‟s training and learning possibilities.145 
The professionalization of traditionally female jobs also limited women‟s 
opportunities in the work place.146 Women began to want to join the 
professions, in order to earn an income which was of a standing 
corresponding to their family‟s social status.147 
 
The separation of work and home meant that women of the ruling classes had 
free time in which they could become involved in religious, charitable and 
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social organisations.148 Some women became involved in the social problems 
that arose during the industrial revolution. Their inability to help in these areas 
led them to become dissatisfied with their own powerlessness.149 In the 
nineteenth century women started to organise in groups to combat their 
powerlessness and fight for the emancipation of women.150 
 
In 1792 Mary Wollstonecraft published A Vindication of the Rights of Women, 
which argued for equal rights on the basis of reason and natural law.151 Her 
argument was that a change in women‟s character and outlook would result in 
change in the social order. 152  
 
In 1851 John Stuart Mill published his book Enfranchisement of Women, 
which argued for women‟s equality and the right of female suffrage.153 His 
book linked female emancipation firmly to the ideas of liberal individualism. 
 
Early feminist groups were largely concerned with economic freedoms for 
women. Industrialisation had created a wealthy propertied class in society so 
ownership of property also became a feminist goal.154 
 
The 1830‟s and 40‟s saw attempts to improve the education of girls and to find 
new forms of employment for women. In the 1880‟s British married women 
obtained the rights to their property and earnings (it no longer fell under the 
control of their husbands).155 The Married Women‟s Property Acts of 1870156 
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and 1882157 changed the marital property laws in Britain. From 1882 onwards 
a woman‟s property no longer passed to her husband at marriage. Married 
women had obtained the right to acquire and dispose of real and personal 
property.158  
 
The fist half of the nineteenth century also saw the emergence of workers‟ 
rights. The working class began to see themselves as separate from their 
employers and as having separate needs from their employers. Workers also 
began to form a sense of community.159 This sense of community combined 
with socialist ideals led to the development of trade unions. Women of the 
working class fought side by side with men against an overload of work. 160 
 
However giving women the right to acquire and dispose of property was an 
insufficient reform, as women did not enjoy or have access to the same level 
of wealth as men. Women brought less into a marriage and were not able to 
acquire as much during their marriage as their husbands. Women‟s wages 
were lower, they were restricted from certain forms of employment and their 
ability to earn wages was restricted by their family responsibilities.161 Thus 
women were still dependent on men for their livelihoods. 
 
This continued dependency led to the realisation that the primary feminist 
issue of the nineteenth century was the issue of suffrage. Women started to 
realise that if they achieved the vote they would then be able to correct 
injustices through legislation.162 The claim for women‟s emancipation 
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developed as part of a much broader campaign, the abolition of slavery, 
advancing the rights of workers and the achievement of property reforms.163 
 
The first country to recognise women‟s right to vote was New Zealand in 
1893. In 1920 the USA congress passed the nineteenth amendment which 
recognised women‟s right to vote. In 1928 women in the United Kingdom 
achieved the same rights to vote as men. In South Africa white women 
achieved the vote in 1930 whereas women of colour only achieved the right to 
vote in 1994. 
 
 4.9 Conclusion 
 
Having achieved some level of equality (such as the right to vote) was and still 
is not enough for women. As socialist feminists suggest there is a need to 
question the patriarchal structures which exist in society to subordinate 
women. The combined effect of capitalist patriarchy has ensured that women 
are subordinated in modern society in vast and various ways. In some forms 
of subordination women are complicit and in other forms of subordination they 
are not. There may even be forms of subordination of which women are as yet 
unaware.  Achieving formal equality such as the right to vote does not ensure 
actual equality between men and women. The substantive reasons for 
women‟s inequality also have to be addressed. 
 
“In virtually all existing cultures, women‟s work, though usually invisible to the 
male eye, sustains the economy and subsidizes the profits, leisure time and 
higher standard of living enjoyed by men, private corporations, and male-
dominated governments. In spite of this, women live almost universally 
without the corresponding economic, political and social control over their 
lives that such a crucial role should mean”.164 Whilst it can be argued that 
women have achieved a degree of equality, the wealth that has been 
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accumulated by women is not equivalent, or at least they have not gained the 
equivalent ownership of private property.165 Therefore there can be no 
argument against the fact that women have been and still are excluded from 
the ownership of private property.  
 
It is impossible to fully consider all the ways in which women are subordinated 
by capitalist patriarchy. As already stated subordination of women occurs in 
different forms in all aspects of life. It occurs within the family, within the work 
environment and in the social environment. Even if it were possible to 
consider all ways in which women are subordinated such a consideration 
would be beyond the scope of this study.  
 
The rest of this study will focus on one specific area of women‟s 
subordination, namely freedom of testation. It is an attempt to rectify one of 
the structures of capitalist patriarchy. The study will consider the concept of 
freedom of testation and how freedom of testation allowed for and continues 
to allow for the accumulation of wealth by men. The study will show how 
freedom of testation excludes women from the ownership of private property 
and the consequential accumulation of wealth.  
 
The next chapter of this study will focus on the concept of freedom of 
testation. The study will show how freedom of testation has allowed for and 
continues to allow for the continued ownership of private property and the 
control of the means of production by men. That freedom of testation supports 
and perpetuates the capitalist patriarchal idea of private property and that this 
has allowed for wealth to accumulate under the control of men. 
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5 Private Property and its perpetuation through 
 Freedom of Testation 
 
 5.1 Introduction 
 
As earlier stated it is possible that in very early history matriarchy may have 
existed and had matriarchy persisted women may have had more control over 
or ownership of private property.  However, it is accepted that even before 
recorded history, patriarchy existed. It is also accepted that women have been 
excluded from participating in the economy for centuries. The preceding 
chapters have shown that women have been excluded from the ownership 
and control of private property since the beginning of recorded history. In 
whatever ways that patriarchy came to be the standard, what is essential is 
that since very early history, women have been excluded from the ownership 
of property and the means of production and that this exclusion continues to 
be supported by, and in turn supports, the capitalist patriarchal system. It is 
suggested that private property (and consequently freedom of testation as a 
method for perpetuating the ownership of private property) forms one of the 
structures of capitalist patriarchy that supports and reinforces capitalist 
patriarchy.  
 
 
As history developed women were consistently educated to a lower level than 
men and therefore when debates surrounding private property arose women 
were unprepared and could not participate in the debates and argue for the 
same rights that men achieved during that period. Women could not argue for 
their rights until much later in history. Women were not able to see themselves 
as individuals with rights and duties until long after men had become to be 
seen as individuals and obtained their rights. By the time women obtained 
rights, the control of property and the means of production was already largely 
in the hands of men.  
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Prior to the nineteenth century women were severely limited in their ownership 
(or control) of property. Even though women have now gained the right to 
ownership and control of their own property, it is still insufficient. Women still 
do not enjoy the same level of wealth as men, their access to wealth is 
restricted, their ability to accumulate wealth is restricted, their earnings are 
lower, the forms of employment available to women are restricted and their 
family responsibilities are greater than men‟s.1 Women‟s ability to acquire 
ownership of property is limited by the fact that most property is already 
owned by men and by the fact that women have greater barriers to overcome 
in order to obtain ownership. 
 
One of the most extreme examples of the structures that support and 
perpetuate capitalist patriarchy, and therefore one of the methods by which 
women have been excluded from the ownership of private property, are the 
methods of succession. Throughout history women have been excluded from 
the ownership and control of private property through the different historical 
methods of succession. These methods have resulted in the form of testate 
succession that is followed in South Africa today. 
 
This chapter will follow the concept of freedom of testation from ancient 
history to modern-day South Africa. The study will show how freedom of 
testation has developed and changed to support capitalist patriarchy and how, 
even in a country which includes the right to equality in the Constitution,2 
freedom of testation still allows for discrimination on the grounds of gender to 
occur. 
 
Arguably the concept of freedom of testation is the most devious form of the 
succession models. In an open and democratic South Africa, freedom of 
testation is recognised and supported by the law, despite the fact that 
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freedom of testation allows for discrimination on the ground of gender to 
occur.3  
 
The history of the concept of freedom of testation shows that it developed in 
order to suit the changing conditions of society.4 It is arguable that freedom of 
testation developed in line with capitalist patriarchy to support the capitalist 
patriarchal system. This paper will discuss freedom of testation as one 
specific example of the structures of capitalist patriarchy that exist in society 
that support and protect capitalist patriarchy.  
 
In Roman times the concept of freedom of testation was concerned with the 
continuation of the family unit and its control of the property. Today the focus 
of freedom of testation has changed from the continuation of property, to the 
continuation of the individual. The testator‟s will or rather his intention is now 
considered to be the primary concern of testate succession. Thus the ideology 
of testate succession has changed from being a continuation of the intestate 
succession rules to a continuation of the testator‟s personality. 
 
This change in ideology was very gradual taking several centuries. The 
Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the Reformation periods were incredibly 
influential. Developments concerning the understanding of the individual and 
individual rights, as well as developments in the ownership of private property, 
contributed to the change. 
 
In order to understand how the change in freedom of testation occurred it was 
necessary to look at how private property and the ownership of private 
property have been viewed over the centuries. This study has already shown 
how the justifications for the ownership of private property changed drastically 
over the centuries. Originally private property was justified by the social order, 
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then by religious theology and finally by the rationality of man. Linking private 
property to the rationality of man has turned private property into an 
expression of individualism. Consequently private property has become 
directly linked to a testator‟s personality. Thus freedom of testation has 
changed from a customary practice to a subjective right of the testator. 
 
 
This chapter will consider the pre-Roman systems of succession, Roman 
succession, the changes that the system of succession underwent during the 
Roman-Dutch period and continues with these changes into the South African 
history of succession. 
 
 5.2 Pre-Roman Succession 
 
In ancient systems of law a man‟s estate devolved according to customary 
practices.5 One argument for the development of these modes of succession 
comes from the religious practice of ancestor worship.6  
 
These ancient communities believed that the spirits of deceased members of 
the family (the ancestors) remained with the household and with their prior 
possessions.7 It was also believed that if regular offerings were made to the 
ancestors, if they were worshipped, that the ancestors would protect and keep 
watch over their living descendants.8 
 
In ancient European communities many generations of the same family lived 
within one household.9 The social unit of these communities was the 
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patriarchal family. The family group was centred on the highest living 
ascendant10 or the oldest of the fathers.11 In Roman law this position became 
known as the paterfamilias.  
 
 5.3 Roman law 
 
In the Roman system of succession the paterfamilias was responsible for the 
civil and religious duties of the family.12   
 
The paterfamilias was the closest living family member to the ancestors. The 
paterfamilias was considered to be the best person to please these domestic 
gods. Thus it was the responsibility of the paterfamilias to worship and pay 
respect to the gods on behalf of the family.13  The paterfamilias would make 
regular offerings to these domestic gods and by doing this he would ensure 
the continued protection of the family group.14  
 
In order to guarantee the protection of the household, it was necessary that 
the paterfamilias performed his role continuously. The offerings had to be 
continuously made and could not be stopped or delayed.  
 
To prevent any break in the duty from occurring, the eldest son of the 
paterfamilias would be appointed as his successor.15 On the death of the 
paterfamilias the eldest son would take over his position and continue to make 
the offerings. It was uncommon for people to be childless,16 but if the 
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paterfamilias did not have any sons he would adopt another male into the 
family to fill his role.17  
 
The position of paterfamilias would pass from the deceased paterfamilias to 
his successor. The family responsibilities and the family possessions would 
also pass from the deceased paterfamilias to his successor. 18 This ensured 
that there would be a religious successor on the death of the paterfamilias19 
and allowed for the continued protection of the family by the ancestor gods.20  
 
The paterfamilias controlled the family property, but he only did this in the best 
interests of the family and the property. When the paterfamilias died and the 
new paterfamilias stepped into his position he succeeded to the property on 
behalf of the family. The property continually belonged to the family rather 
than the paterfamilias. Thus the holder of the position of head of the family 
changed rather than the ownership of property.21  
 
Apart from the religious importance, this form of inheritance also made the 
most economic sense. The eldest son would have grown up with the property 
and he would have learnt from the paterfamilias how to use such property 
efficiently. A close relationship between the paterfamilias and his successor 
would have existed. From this relationship the successor would have gained 
an understanding of the obligations and responsibilities of the position of the 
paterfamilias.22 Generally the eldest son would be the most capable person to 
take over the family responsibilities on the death of the paterfamilias. 
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Thus a mode of succession developed from these religious beliefs. The 
religious responsibilities, family responsibilities and property passed from the 
deceased to his successor.23  
This system of succession is apparent in early Roman law. Early Romans also 
believed in ancestor worship. It was recognised that a person‟s descendents 
had the duty of continuing the family and the family‟s religious 
responsibilities.24  
  5.3.1 Testate Succession 
In early Roman law the paterfamilias could transfer ownership of property to a 
successor via a will. Because of the existence of rudimentary wills in early 
Roman law it has been argued that, by this time, the Roman law of 
succession had developed to provide testators with a limited freedom of 
testation.25 
It is submitted that this concept of freedom of testation was not the same 
concept of freedom of testation that we have today. It was simply another 
method of ensuring that the family property passed to the best possible 
caretaker.26 The concern in Roman times was not the disposal of property 
rather it was the institution of a successor.  
The original concept of a will arose when there were no family members to 
take over the role of paterfamilias. If there were no sons then the customary 
mode of succession could not apply and another person needed to be 
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appointed successor. Through the drafting of a will the paterfamilias could 
appoint somebody, other than a son, as his successor. 27 
At a later stage even a man who had a son was allowed to draft a will in which 
he appointed his son as his successor or the testator could draft a will in 
which provision was made provision for his son not surviving him or attaining 
majority.28  
   6.3.1.1 The types of wills in Roman law 
In early Roman law there were three forms of wills with a fourth developing in 
the classical period of Roman law. The first, the testamentum calatis comitiis 
was a declaration in front of the comitia calatis.29  
The comitia met only twice a year, and women were not included in the 
comitia business. 30 It may have been a requirement that the comitia vote to 
approve the contents of the will.31 Because of these limitations of the 
testamentum calatis comitiis it is clear that testation in this form was not 
popular.32 
The second form, the will in procinctu, was available only to soldiers.33 
The third type of will was the nuncupative will. Although this form had few 
restrictions, other than the requirement of witnesses, it was also not much in 
use.34 
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Finally the testamentum per aes et libram developed to deal with the 
inadequacies of the testamentum calatis comitiis.35 This will originally took the 
form of a fictitious sale from the testator to his successor.36 However, in later 
law, as writing became more common, the formalities of the sale were done 
away with.37  
After the time of the Twelve Tables the testamentum per aes et libram (in its 
developed form) was the most popular method of succession in Roman law.38 
However even though it seems similar in form to the will we use today39 the 
substance of the will was different.  
There were restrictions placed on the testamentum per aes et libram 
concerning who could make a will, who could succeed under a will and what 
could form part of the estate. These restrictions prescribed the substance of 
the will to such an extent that there was in fact no freedom of testation. 
   5.3.1.2 Who could draft a will 
To begin with only adult Roman citizens who were sui iuris40 were able to draft 
a will.41  A person only became sui iuris upon the death of their paterfamilias, 
thereby releasing him from the patria potestas.42 Therefore anybody whose 
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father was still living and who was still under the patria potestas43 of the 
paterfamilias was unable to draft a will. The age of adulthood in Roman times 
was twenty five.44 Therefore nobody under the age of twenty five was able to 
draft a will.  
No peregrini (foreigner) could make a will.45 
Originally women were thought to be incapable of drafting a will.46 In later law 
this idea changed and there are some records of women drafting wills. 
However the majority of women were either under a form of tutelage47 or 
under the manus of their husband.48 Therefore most women did not draft wills 
or certainly did not enjoy freedom of testation in the drafting of their wills. 
This meant that only a restricted number of males and a very few liberated 
females drafted wills. 
   5.3.1.2 Who could succeed under a will 
The people who could succeed under a will were also limited. In early law 
peregrini, widows who remarried within a year of the passing on of their 
previous husband, and a few other classes or people49 were unable to 
succeed. In later law heretics and the children of traitors were prevented from 
succeeding.50 
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There were three classes of people who were able to succeed: sui et 
necessarri heirs, necessarri heirs or extranei heirs.51 
    5.3.1.2.1 Sui et necessarri heirs 
Sui et necessarri heirs were descendants of the deceased who fell under his 
patria potestas and became sui iuris at his death. If these successors were 
included in the will they had no choice but to succeed, hence they were called 
necessary heirs.52  
Both sons and daughters were considered to be sui et necessarri heirs. 
However the inclusion of daughters is nominal. Daughters of the paterfamilias, 
who married in manu, passed into the power of their husbands and could not 
succeed from their fathers. Daughters who were in potestate (no longer under 
the control of a paterfamilias) could be a successor. However, the risk of a 
daughter carrying the inheritance into the control of another family by her 
marriage meant that it was highly unlikely that a testator would include a 
daughter in the succession.53 Instead a father would provide for his daughter 
by giving her a dos - a dowry.54  However, even this property would be 
controlled by her husband.55 
Women were not allowed to be the head of the family and could not exercise 
the patria potestas of the paterfamilias.56 It was considered unnecessary for 
women to have control of property as they had no family responsibilities. So it 
was unusual for a daughter to be a successor to her father. If a daughter was 
included in the succession, it was in name only. The real control would be in 
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the hands of the daughter‟s guardians.57 A daughter who was no longer under 
patria potestas or the manus of a husband would be placed under the tutelage 
of her older relatives. This ensured that any property she may have acquired 
from her deceased paterfamilias would be protected and could not be 
alienated. Upon her death, the property would return to the estate of her 
family.58 
This meant that sui et necessarri heirs were generally male descendants of 
the testator. This is simply another form of the practice which originated from 
ancestor worship. 
    5.3.1.2.2 Necessarri heirs 
Necessarri heirs were slaves who inherited under their masters will. These 
were also necessary heirs in that they had no choice but to succeed to the 
estate if they were included in their masters will.59  A testator would appoint 
his slave as his successor and upon his death the slave would become a 
freeman.60  
A testator would appoint his slave as his successor if the testator was 
insolvent and did not want the indignity of insolvency to lie on his name or his 
family.61 The testator would not have burdened his descendants with the 
shame of insolvency and so would have chosen a slave to bear that burden. 
Having an insolvent estate in Roman times was considered to be such a 
disgrace62 that the testator had practically no choice but to institute his slave.  
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Presumably the descendants of the deceased would now fall under the patria 
potestas of their uncle or eldest male relative. Wives would pass back into the 
patria potestas of their fathers. 
By appointing his slave as successor the testator provides for his family as 
they will not have to settle the testator‟s liabilities. Thus this is again an 
example of the testator providing for and protecting his family. 
    5.3.1.2.3 Extranei Heirs 
Extranei heirs were people who were not members of the testator‟s family.63 
These successors had a choice whether to accept or reject the succession. 
They were not considered to be necessary heirs. A testator would appoint an 
extranei heir to replace non-existent sons or the testator may have been 
choosing someone who was better suited than his sons to provide for the 
family and protect the family property.  
Hadley submits that a testator was not required to be acquainted with the 
extranei heir; he only had to have a firm idea of who the intended successor 
was.64 However it is unlikely that a testator would appoint a successor who 
would not have accepted the succession. Nor would a testator have appointed 
a successor who would not care for his descendants, or not have dealt with 
the estate in an efficient and respectful manner. It is most likely that the 
extranei heir would have been aware that he had been appointed as 
successor to the testator and had agreed to fulfil the role of paterfamilias. 
It is submitted that as the popular testamentum per aes et libram originated 
from an imaginary sale of the estate from the testator to the successor, it is 
likely that the extranei heir (the purchaser) would be aware that the testator 
had chosen him as his successor. The extranei heir would have had to have 
been present at the imaginary sale and would be aware that he was 
succeeding to the testator‟s estate.  
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By Roman law separating the heirs into these three classes it is possible to 
see that the classes of heirs merely allowed for the continuation of the 
customary practices. 
   5.3.1.3 Other limitations on who could be  
     appointed as successor 
Other limitations on who could be appointed as a successor developed in 
Roman law to ensure that the person who was appointed successor was the 
person most capable of fulfilling the role of paterfamilias. 
During the later Republic the Vocanian Law ensured that a woman could not 
be appointed as successor by a person who had an estate worth more that 
one thousand asses.65 This further limited the number of women who could 
succeed to an estate. During the reign of Augustus the Lex Julia prevented a 
person who was not married at the death of the testator (or did not marry 
within 100 days after the death of the testator) from succeeding under the 
will.66 
The Lex Pappia Popea, which was also passed during the reign of Augustus, 
prevented people who were married but childless from succeeding under the 
will of a testator.67 
It was a matter of public concern that the relatives who depended upon the 
paterfamilias would not be deprived of their succession upon his death.68 It 
became accepted that certain relations had to be provided for and could not 
be excluded in the will of the testator.69 It was so usual for the son of a 
testator to succeed to the estate that in order to exclude a son from the 
succession a testator had to follow a specific form  If the testator did not follow 
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the specific form the will would be invalid and the successors would inherit 
intestate.70  
The querela inofficiosa testamenti was an action designed to contest a will 
which went contrary to this natural duty.71 If near and dependant relatives of 
the testator had not been included in the will they could use the querela 
inofficiosa testamenti to contest the will for a legitimate portion of the 
inheritance.72 
   5.3.1.4 The estate 
Apart from the limitations on who could make a will and who could succeed 
under a will, there were also other factors which indicate that the concept of 
freedom of testation in Roman times was not the same concept as we 
understand it today.  
It is a widely recognised concept in Roman law that succession on death was 
the universal succession to all the rights and liabilities of a deceased person.73 
The successors succeeded to the property as a universal succession.74  
The concept of universal succession meant that the property of the deceased 
was not split up into the different pieces, it remained as one unit. 75 A 
successor could not succeed to a portion or a specific part of the deceased‟s 
estate. This was known as succedere in locum defuncti – stepping into the 
place of the deceased.76 The appointed successor would succeed to all the 
rights and liabilities of the deceased. This suggests that the Roman concept of 
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universal succession was succession to the status of the deceased rather 
than to the deceased‟s property.77  
The paterfamilias had the ability to institute one of the potential successors as 
successor to an undivided estate whilst depriving any other potential 
successors.78 
This is opposed to singular succession as we understand it today.79 Under 
singular succession the different heirs can inherit different and separate 
portions of an estate. However, the Roman concept was more of a 
continuation than an inheritance80 as the successor is treated as though he 
were the deceased.81 There is only mention of material possessions in terms 
of an accessory to the family.82 
Even if more than one successor was appointed in a will, the co-successors 
still inherited as a universal succession. The co-successors did not inherit 
specific assets or even a specific percentage of the estate. They each 
succeeded to all of the rights and all of the obligations.83 Not only did they 
form a community of property but it also symbolised the relationship in the 
family.84 The family would remain together as a community. All the successors 
became responsible for all the rights and obligations. 
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   5.3.1.5 Conclusion 
Considering the accumulation of these limitations – who could draft a will, who 
could succeed under a will and what could form part of the estate – it is 
apparent that the term freedom of testation has been incorrectly applied to the 
Roman law of succession. The risk that a testator would deprive his family of 
his estate seems to have been of no consequence in the Roman 
period.85Freedom of testation, as we currently understand it, is a recent 
development in the progress of society.86 The Roman law of succession was 
merely a continuation of the ancient inheritance practices associated with 
ancestor worship. 
 
 5.4 Freedom of Testation in the Middle Ages 
 
As has already been stated freedom of testation has changed from a method 
for the continuation of property to the continuation of the individual. This 
change occurred during the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment 
periods. 
.  
Having legal rules surrounding succession presupposes the existence of 
private property. Thus until human beings had a concept of private property 
the legal rules surrounding succession were no more than a codification of the 
customary practices. Only when human beings had an understanding of a 
testator as an individual, holding individual rights, and of private property 
rights  and such rights attaching to an individual could there be an expression 
of the testators‟ will and thus freedom of testation.  
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Thus, only once Grotius had created rights and codified them, could there be 
a right to private property and only with the ideas of individualism that were 
developed by Locke, and Hegel (and others) could those rights become 
subjective rights, i.e. rights that belonged to individuals. 
 
Around the nineteenth century freedom of testation came to be seen as an 
expression of an individual‟s will. Freedom of testation was no longer a 
misinterpreted codification of the customary succession practices. Rather 
freedom of testation had morphed into an individual right. Property, which 
changed ownership upon death, no longer belonged to a role, such as that of 
the paterfamilias, rather an individual had a right in such property and could 
direct his will over such property. Thus the ability to direct what happens to 
your property after your death was seen as an expression of the individuals 
will or a continuation of that individual‟s personality. From the nineteenth 
century onwards it becomes more correct to speak of inheritance of property 
as opposed to succession to property.  
 
Up to the nineteenth century what has been misleadingly referred to as 
freedom of testation was curbed in various methods to ensure that the 
testators‟ will benefited his family.87 It was not until the fourteenth century that 
a general rule emerged that gave every man the ability to dispose of his 
personal property via a will.88 During the thirteenth century it was decided that 
land could not be disposed of via a will and that the land automatically passed 
to the heir. Usually the heir was decided by following the rules of 
primogeniture, so the eldest male son or nearest male relative would inherit.89 
It may be argued that during the Middle Ages freedom of testation developed 
to provide that a portion of personal property could be disposed of at the 
testator‟s discretion (once the surviving spouse and children had been 
provided for). However, this portion was often intended to be given to the 
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Church for the good of the testator‟s soul.90 The Church supported freedom of 
testation provided that the testator made pious bequests.91 Thus the power of 
testation was more conditioned than a real, actual choice made by the 
testator. Society expected that the choice would be made in favour of the 
Church.92  
 
Thus freedom of testation did not exist in the Middle Ages. However in the 
nineteenth century due to the changing ideas concerning the individual and 
private property the absolute concept of freedom of testation comes to the 
forefront of succession law.93 Indeed freedom of testation, “exalts the volition 
of the property holder it is consistent with free market economics”.94 Thus 
freedom of testation had become linked to the economic system. It upholds 
and perpetuates capitalism. 
 
This change in ideology can be seen quite clearly in the South African law of 
succession. This change will be discussed in the following section. Many 
European countries, although they express the concept of freedom of 
testation, have kept limitations on the freedom and thus, in part, continue to 
be an expression of the customary succession practices. Thus testate 
succession in most other westernised countries ensures that the surviving 
spouse and the family are provided for from the deceased estate.95  The 
patriarchal practices which ensured that men benefited from this succession 
have largely been done away with. Although it is suggested that patriarchal 
inheritance may continue in the small portion of the estate that is subject to 
free testation. 
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The South African system of testate succession, however, has the most 
absolute concept of freedom of testation and there is a marked difference in 
South African law between testate and intestate succession practices.96 
 
 
 5.4 Introduction to South African Law 
 
By the time that freedom of testation changed from a customary practice to a 
subjective right the customary practice of succession had already been 
introduced to South African law. 
 
In 1652 the Dutch East India Company97 created a refreshment station at the 
Cape of Good Hope for their ships travelling to the Far East.98 The Dutch East 
India Company had been delegated power by the States-General of the 
United Netherlands to maintain law and order in their overseas possessions. 
Under such authority the VOC enforced law and order in the Cape of Good 
Hope.99 
 
Initially law was enforced by VOC representatives in the Cape, in the form of a 
ship‟s council. Later a type of court, the Raad van Justisie, took over this role.  
This court was originally constituted of laymen and the later Dutch lawyers 
who settled in the cape.100  
 
Any placaeten that were issued by the States-General of the United 
Netherlands were also included into the law at the Cape.101 The common law 
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of the province of Holland was accepted as the common law of the Cape 
colony.102  And with the introduction of Dutch settlers to the Cape, their ideas 
and customs had a strong influence on the mores of the Cape.103 
 
Thus by the time of the British occupation of the cape, in 1795, the Roman-
Dutch law formed the basis of law in the Cape. Later the Roman-Dutch law 
was introduced to Natal in 1845 and it was included as the common law of the 
Transvaal and the Orange River Colony.104 
The Roman-Dutch law of testate succession had strict requirements for the 
drafting of wills and severely limited how the testator could dispose of his 
property.105 It was accepted that the general principles of Roman law applied 
in the province of Holland and consequently they accepted the principles of 
the Roman law of succession.106 It was this form of testate succession which 
was introduced into the Cape colony. 
At the time of introduction the Roman-Dutch law of testate succession 
included the Lex hac edictali. This rule prevented a testator from giving a 
larger portion of his estate to any children by a second wife than the portion 
given to any children by his first wife.107 The rules concerning Falcidian and 
Trebellian Fourths (which provided that an heir could claim one fourth of the 
estate)108 as well as the legitimate portion rule (this entitled descendants to 
one third of their intestate share109) were also included.110 This meant that a 
descendant of the deceased, who had been disinherited, could claim their 
legitimate portion (one third of their intestate share) from the deceased estate. 
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The Falcidian and Trebellian rules provided grounds for a child to challenge 
the will of their ascendant if they felt they had been unjustly disinherited.111  
Thus at the introduction of the Roman-Dutch law of testate succession to the 
Cape (and subsequently Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange river Colony) 
freedom of testation was subject to these limitations. 
 
In 1795 the English took possession of the Cape to protect it from the 
aggressive intentions of Napoleon Bonaparte.112 At that time the British 
government followed a practice whereby they did not change the existing laws 
of their colonies except where such laws conflicted with British occupation.113 
Thus, regardless of British occupation, the Roman-Dutch law remained as the 
law of the Cape colony.114  
 
Despite the British commitment to preserving the Roman-Dutch law it became 
increasingly difficult to do so. The courts became staffed by English trained 
judges and lawyers,115  who had to apply Roman-Dutch principles.116 The 
Roman-Dutch law also started to stagnate as it was no longer subject to the 
developments made in the legal system in Holland. 117 Shortly thereafter the 
Roman-Dutch law in Holland was replaced by the Code Napoleon and thus 
ceased to be a living system of law.118 The only recourse to the law which 
lawyers in the Cape colony had was to the writings of the Dutch jurists, such 
as Hugo Grotius.119  
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In 1820, due to the large number of English settlers to the Cape and the 
difficulties of applying the Roman-Dutch law, a decision was taken to anglicise 
the law.120 
 
As trade with England grew, the English maritime and commercial customs 
were adopted by the Cape colony.121 English legal practices and rules began 
to be introduced, such as the principle of stare decisis and the English 
criminal law.122 English ideas and mores were introduced to the colony with 
the English settlers. For example English settlers in the Cape, who had been 
married in England, were allowed to administer their property in terms of 
English law.123 English law particularly influenced the South African law of 
testate succession.  
 
The English law of testate succession had experienced profound changes 
over the centuries. Originally the family members enjoyed fixed rights in the 
estate of the testator. By the nineteenth century all restrictions had been 
removed leaving a concept of absolute freedom of testation.124 Eventually the 
English law has reverted to family members having discretionary rights in the 
testator‟s estate.125 However at the time when the issue of freedom of 
testation arose in South Africa the English law was far more laissez-faire than 
the Roman-Dutch law in its approach towards private property and 
consequently the succession laws.126 
 
Under the English influence the Roman-Dutch Falcidian and Trebellian rules 
were removed from the South African law of succession by the Law of 
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Inheritance Amendment Act.127 A year later the legitimate portion rule was 
abolished by the Succession Act.128 This Act provided that no legitimate 
portion will be claimable by anybody from the deceased testator‟s estate. The 
Act further provides that a testator will have the full power to disinherit any 
child, parent, relative or descendant without assigning any reason for such 
disinheritance.129  
 
The promulgation of these Acts meant that the South African concept of 
freedom of testation was now absolute. A testator was free to choose to 
dispose of his property via his will in any way they wished. And unlike other 
countries (including English law) which have amended their testamentary 
institutions to suit the prevailing legal trends, the South African concept has 
remained relatively absolute.130 
 
The South African law now recognises very few limitations on freedom of 
testation. Courts can refuse to give effect to a testator‟s will should the 
instructions be illegal, against public policy or vague and uncertain. There are 
also some common law and statutory restrictions, such as the Maintenance of 
Surviving Spouses Act and those concerning the disposal of immovable 
property. The interests of creditors in the estate must be satisfied before the 
instructions of the testator can be fulfilled.131 However despite these 
limitations the South African concept of freedom of testation is considered to 
be very broad and unfettered.  
 
Unlike other western countries the South African law of testate succession is 
open to abuse, and patriarchal values are allowed to influence inheritance and 
through such inheritance patriarchal values are perpetuated. 
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The next chapter will look at a case study where patriarchal values affected 
testate inheritance and were thus perpetuated by the concept of freedom of 
testation. 
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6 Syfrets 
  
 6.1 Introduction 
 
Since 1993 it has become unconstitutional to discriminate inter alia on the 
ground of gender.1 However, as stated in the introduction, it is very difficult to 
determine whether discrimination is occurring in testamentary dispositions. 
Testaments are considered to be private documents and therefore the 
dispositions contained therein only become known upon the death of the 
testator. The majority of testaments which are being drafted under the new 
constitutional dispensation will only become actionable when the testator dies 
(which hopefully for the majority of testators will only be in the future). Also the 
legal system only becomes aware of testaments which are challenged in the 
courts. Therefore there may be several testaments which do discriminate on 
the ground of gender without a justifiable reason, but which are not 
challenged in the courts and are thus never rectified. These factors make it 
very difficult to ascertain whether discrimination actually does occur in 
testaments, and if it does occur how frequently it occurs and what forms it 
occurs in. 2 
 
In light of this there has only been one case in which testamentary 
discrimination on the ground of gender has been challenged.3 This is the 
Syfrets case. This testament was drafted in 1920. The testament was drafted 
under conditions which no longer exist in modern day South Africa.  
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The Syfrets case revolved around the following circumstances. In March 
2002, the former Minister of Education, Mr. Kadar Asmal, found a newspaper 
advertisement for the Scarbrow Bursary Fund. The advertisement invited 
deserving students studying at the University of Cape Town to apply for a 
bursary from the Scarbrow Bursary Fund. Applicants for the bursary were 
limited to people “of European descent, male, gentile”.4 Thus only white, non-
Jewish males could apply.  
 
The Minister felt that these criteria were contrary to the equality clause in 
section 9 of the Constitution.5 He thought that the conditions discriminated on 
the grounds of race, gender and religion. The Minister, therefore, requested 
Syfrets Trust Limited (the Trustees of the fund) to remove the exclusionary 
criteria.6 
 
The Trustees were unwilling to remove the contested criteria. They stated that 
they were bound, by the concept of freedom of testation, to uphold the wishes 
of the Testator. The Trustees would only amend the conditions of the trust if 
ordered to do so by a Court.7 The Minister then approached the Court for such 
an order. 
 
The case came before Griesel J in the Cape High Court. The Minister, as well 
as the University of Cape Town, requested that the discriminatory conditions 
be removed from the will. They based their request on section 13 of the Trust 
Property Control Act 57 of 1988, the common law and a direct application of 
the Constitution. 8 
 
Syfrets Trust Limited, as the first respondent, and the Master of the Court, as 
the nominal second respondent, represented the interests of the Scarbrow 
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Bursary Fund.9 A curator ad litem was appointed to represent the interests of 
the potential beneficiaries.10  
 
Both the respondents and the curator ad litem argued for upholding the 
principle of freedom of testation.11 Their reasoning was that the South African 
law of succession is founded on the concept of freedom of testation.12 
Freedom of testation is a cornerstone of the law of succession and amending 
it in this way would reduce the principle to a nullity.  No reasons were provided 
as to why freedom of testation is, or should be, a cornerstone of the South 
African law of succession. 
 
The respondents also argued that the concept was guaranteed constitutional 
protection under the property clause, section 25(1).13 Further, the curator ad 
litem relied on the rights to dignity (section 10), privacy (section 14) and 
freedom (section 12) to support the concept of freedom of testation. 14 
 
It was shown that the testator, Dr Edmund William Scarbrow, established the 
Scarbrow Bursary Fund in the terms of his will. Such will was drafted in 
1920.15 In 1920 unfair discrimination against women, persons of colour, or 
people from different religious backgrounds was acceptable.16  It was not 
contrary to public policy to discriminate in these ways.  The testator died in 
1921 and the Trust became active in 1965 after the death of his last son.17 
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With the Constitution, the principle of public policy has come to be guided by 
the constitutional values.18 The social and political environment in which we 
live is very different from that of the 1920‟s. Human dignity, equality, non-
racialism, non-sexism and the advancement of human rights and freedoms 
are now important values for South Africans.  
 
 The three arguments on which the application was based, namely, section 13 
of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988, the common law and a direct 
application of the Constitution are all based on the equality clause.19 However 
Griesel J decided to settle the case on the public policy issue.20 Hence his job 
was to decide whether the conditions of the Scarbrow Bursary Fund, which 
discriminate against race, gender and religion, were contrary to public 
policy.21 Looking at it from a different angle Griesel J had to decide whether 
the right to property22  and its corollaries of private succession and freedom of 
testation are limited by the principles of public policy.23  
 
Griesel J essentially makes his decision on the basis of public policy, “In my 
view, the answer is self evident: it can never be in the public interest of a 
society founded on „the achievement of equality‟ to deny access to funding, to 
continue their education, to previously disadvantaged and marginalised 
groups of people on the basis of their race, gender or religion.”24  
 
Griesel J does briefly look at the Constitutional challenge of the equality right 
to determine whether there has been discrimination and whether such 
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discrimination is unfair.25 However his discussion of the equality right is limited 
to the Harksen case. 
 
The case of Harksen sets out the test for actions which amount to unfair 
discrimination.26  The test begins by asking whether the action differentiates 
between people or categories of people and if so whether this differentiation is 
connected to a legitimate government purpose. The test asks whether the 
action concerned amounts to discrimination – if it is on one of the listed 
grounds in section 9 then discrimination is established.27 It then enquires into 
whether such discrimination is unfair. Again if the discrimination is on one of 
the listed grounds it is presumed to be unfair discrimination.28 Finally, if the 
action amounts to unfair discrimination, it must be decided whether such 
discriminatory action can be justified in terms of the limitations clause, section 
36 of the Constitution.29 
 
In terms of the Harksen test, the conditions of Syfrets discriminate on the 
listed grounds of race, gender and religion and are therefore presumed to be 
unfair discrimination. According to the Harksen test Griesel J should then 
have performed a section 36 limitation enquiry, to decide whether the unfair 
discrimination caused by freedom of testation is a justifiable limitation of the 
equality right. However as Griesel J decides the case on the basis of public 
policy he simply assumes that unfair discrimination is contrary to public policy 
and is therefore unjustifiable. 30 He substantiates his assumption by referring 
to section 29 of the Equality Act, the National Education Policy Act 27 of 1996 
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (1979).31  
                                                 
25  Syfrets [33] 
26  Harksen [53]. 
27  Harksen [53]. 
28  Harksen [53]. 
29  Harksen [53]. 
30  Syfrets [32]. 
31  Syfrets [34]. 
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However, unfair discrimination is not automatically contrary to public policy 
and it was incorrect for Griesel J to assume that it was. To determine whether 
it is contrary to public policy Griesel J should have performed a section 36 
limitation enquiry. It is possible, in some situations, for unfair discrimination to 
be acceptable public policy. Griesel J admits that his judgement “does not 
mean that all clauses in wills that differentiate between different groups of 
people are invalid”.32 He limits his finding of invalidity to the current 
circumstances. There have been instances where the Constitutional Court 
has found unfair discrimination to be a justifiable limitation in terms of a 
section 36 enquiry. In the case of Lotus River, Ottery, Grassy Park Residents 
Association v South Peninsula Municipality, it was decided that the 
implementation of an across the board rates increase, despite resulting in 
discrimination on racial grounds, was, upon performing  a section 36 limitation 
enquiry, found to be justifiable because the respondents had used the least 
restrictive means possible and the implementation of the rates increase was 
only a temporary measure and thus the discrimination would only be 
temporary. 33  
 
The question has to be asked as to what might be considered to be fair 
discrimination and may therefore amount to a limitation of the equality right.34 
De Waal correctly suggests that a section 36 limitation enquiry should be 
performed to consider whether the equality right can be limited by the concept 
of freedom of testation.35. However De Waal‟s enquiry is incorrectly 
concerned with the limitation of the property right than with the limitation of the 
                                                 
32  Syfrets [48]. 
33  Lotus River, Ottery, Grassy Park Residents Association v South Peninsula 
Municipality 1999 (4) BCLR 440 (C). Prince v President of the Law Society of the 
Cape of Good Hope 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC) [45] is also an example of unfair 
discrimination that is justifiable, although in this case the discrimination is against 
freedom of religion. See also Du Toit “The constitutionally bound dead hand? The 
impact of constitutional rights and principles on freedom of testation in South African 
law” 2001 (2) Stell 234 – 239. for what might constitute constitutional limitations of 
freedom of testation. 
 
35  De Waal “The law of Succession and the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights 
Compendium 3G11. 
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equality right. De Waal finds that the property right and its corollaries, the right 
of succession and freedom of testation, cannot justifiably be limited by the 
equality right and therefore he finds that testamentary clauses which might 
institute one gender as opposed to the other gender as heir are valid despite 
the blatant discrimination.36  
 
It is submitted that the question should have been whether the equality right 
can justifiably be limited by freedom of testation and not whether the property 
right can be justifiably limited by equality. Had Griesel J performed a limitation 
enquiry he may still have arrived at the same decision. However the decision 
would be more persuasive had he followed the prescribed format. It would 
also have been beneficial for South Africa‟s equality jurisprudence had he 
performed the limitations enquiry. 
 
As Griesel J found that the unfair discrimination was contrary to public policy 
he was able to limit the scope of freedom of testation.37The applicants were 
successful and the Scarbrow Bursary Fund is now available to deserving 
students of the University of Cape Town, despite their race, religion or gender.  
 
 6.3 Conclusion 
 
The Syfrets case is now precedent for the amendment of discriminatory wills. 
However as Griesel J failed to perform a limitation enquiry it is difficult to know 
what other forms of discrimination will limit freedom of testation and what will 
not, whether some forms of discrimination would be considered justifiable or 
not. Obviously conditions that are similar to the Syfrets case would be 
considered unconstitutional.  
 
                                                 
36  De Waal “The law of Succession and the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights 
Compendium 3G11. 
37  Syfrets [47]. 
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Discrimination on listed grounds,38 other than gender, race and religion, also 
occurs in testamentary dispositions and as of yet no decision has been made 
as to whether such discrimination is justifiable or not. Before the Constitution 
was enacted, some forms of what became listed discrimination were 
considered to be acceptable. Clauses which restrain remarriage have been 
upheld. It is arguable that these restraint of marriage clauses would now 
amount to discrimination on the ground of marital status.39 „Jewish faith and 
race‟ clauses have also been upheld.40 If these clauses received constitutional 
scrutiny they might now also be considered to be unconstitutional.41  
In the past these discriminatory clauses have been considered to be 
acceptable in terms of public policy. It has been acceptable to discriminate in 
a will on the listed grounds of marital status, religion and race. Would these 
forms of discrimination survive an application of the Constitution? As this case 
only concerns the specific conditions of the Syfrets trust and no limitation 
enquiry was performed it is difficult to decide this. 
 Perhaps freedom of testation, as a concept, needs to be reconsidered with 
respect to the new Constitution and not simply the terms of Dr Scarbrow‟s will. 
A consideration of the role of freedom of testation under the new dispensation 
would have been preferable instead of a consideration of discriminatory 
clauses on a case by case basis. This would provide a precedent for the 
concept of freedom of testation in future testamentary drafting rather than 
dealing with discriminatory clauses on a case by case basis.
                                                 
38  The Constitution, S9 (3), such as race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth.  
39  Ex Parte Dessels [1976] 2 All SA 67 (D). See also Corbett et al The law of 
Succession in South Africa 130 and 136. 
40  Aronson v Estate Hart and Others 2 [1950] 2 All SA 13 (A). See also Corbett et al 
The law of Succession in South Africa 130 – 134. 
41  Such a finding would raise a debate about inclusive discriminatory terms (or indirect 
discrimination) and exclusive discriminatory terms however such a debate is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
As has already been discussed, the South African law of testate succession is 
a combination of the Roman law (brought to South Africa through Roman 
Dutch law) and English law. The current South African concept of freedom of 
testation is relatively absolute. A South African testator is relatively free to 
dispose of his property via a will in any way he wishes.1  
As previously discussed, the Roman-Dutch law of testate succession 
originally included rules which ensured that testators provided for their 
dependent family members.  However, at the time when the issue of freedom 
of testation arose in South Africa, the English law was far more laissez-faire 
than the Roman-Dutch law in its approach towards private property and 
consequently in its approach to the succession laws.2 Under the influence of 
the English law the Roman-Dutch protections were removed from the South 
African law of succession.3  
 
South African law now recognises very few limitations on freedom of 
testation.4 Courts can refuse to give effect to a testator‟s will should the 
instructions be illegal, against public policy or vague and uncertain.5 There are 
also some common law and statutory restrictions, such as those concerning 
the disposal of immovable property or that the interests of creditors in the 
estate must be satisfied before the instructions of the testator can be fulfilled.6  
A minor child has a common law right to claim maintenance from the estate 
                                                 
1  Du Toit “The constitutionally bound dead hand? The impact of constitutional rights 
and principles on freedom of testation in South African law” 2001 2 Stell LR 222 
224. 
2  Hosten et al Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory 687. 
3  This was achieved by the Law of Inheritance Amendment Act 26 of 1873 and the 
Succession Act 23 of 1874. 
4  Eventually the English law reverted to family members having discretionary rights in 
the testator‟s estate. See Margrave-Jones Mellows: The Law of Succession (1993) 
204. 
5  Corbett et al The Law of Succession in South Africa 40. 
6  Corbett et al The Law of Succession in South Africa 40. 
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and surviving spouses who require maintenance, and were not provided for in 
a will, can claim in respect of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act.7  
 
However, despite these limitations the South African concept of freedom of 
testation is considered to be very broad and unfettered.8 And once all these 
claims against the estate have been met there is still a portion of the estate 
with which the testator can do what he wishes. It is with this remaining portion 
or with those estates which do not have to meet these claims (for example 
where there is no surviving spouse or dependant minor child) that the South 
African law of testate succession allows for discrimination on the ground of 
gender. Women may still be excluded from inheritance, simply because they 
are female, because it is the testator‟s will. 
 
De Waal suggests that when testamentary discrimination results in a complete 
disinheritance, for example when a testator disinherits a daughter because of 
her gender, that the testator‟s right to freedom of testation should be given 
preference over the disinherited‟s right to equal treatment.9 
 
De Waal raises three motivations for his argument. Namely, that it would 
reduce the concept of freedom of testation to a nullity, that the disinherited 
has no fundamental right to inherit and the practical difficulties of not 
recognising the testator‟s wishes.10 
 
De Waal then states that where the discrimination attaches to a condition on 
the bequest as opposed to the bequest itself, it is possible that such condition 
could be declared constitutionally invalid.11 Thus the condition could be 
                                                 
7  De Waal Introduction to the Law of Succession  4. 
8  Du Toit “The constitutionally bound dead hand? The impact of constitutional rights 
and principles on freedom of testation in South African law” 2001 2 Stell LR 224. 
9  De Waal Introduction to Succession 5. 
10  De Waal Introduction to Succession 6. 
11  De Waal Introduction to Succession 6. 
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regarded as pro non scripto and the bequest could be fulfilled without the 
condition. 
 
It is submitted that De Waal‟s argument is contradictory as declaring 
conditional bequests invalid also reduces freedom of testation to a nullity and 
as these testaments have to be dealt with on a case by case basis (rather 
than there being one rule which applies to all testaments) the practical 
difficulties are just as prominent. 
 
The Preamble of the Constitution creates a duty to, “Heal the divisions of the 
past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights.”12 Considering that historically women have been 
excluded from wealth, from the ownership and control of private property, from 
the ownership and control of the means of production, it is easy to see that 
they have been historically discriminated against. Despite this the South 
African law of testate succession still allows for such discrimination to be 
perpetuated through freedom of testation. It is no longer acceptable. 
 
The precedent of Syfrets ensures that on a case by case basis discrimination, 
via testamentary disposition, does not occur. However, this can only happen 
in those cases which receive judicial scrutiny and in which the discrimination 
is evident. In the Syfrets case the discrimination was evident from the text, 
however this may not be true in all testaments. Any testator who wants to 
discriminate (or intends to discriminate without realising that it is 
discrimination) can, with a simply worded will, ensure that his estate devolves 
in a discriminatory manner. Or in other words, a testator who wants to 
maintain patriarchal hierarchy can do so with a simply worded will. Indeed 
lawyers who have clients who wish to discriminate in their testaments, advise 
them to discriminate in their testaments but not to state the reasons as to why 
they are discriminating.13 
                                                 
12  The Constitution, Preamble. 
13  Jacobs “Not Over my Dead Body” http://www.walkers.co.za/features/deadbody.html 
accessed on 3/02/2007. 
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Provided that the clause in a will is worded in such a way that the 
discrimination is not evident from the text it is unlikely that these types of 
clauses will be challenged. Thus, for example, a testator may leave his estate 
to, „my son‟ and exclude his daughter because she is female. Provided that 
the testator does not state why his daughter is excluded i.e. because she is 
female, this clause cannot be challenged because it is protected by the right 
to free testamentary disposition. Thus freedom of testation upholds capitalist 
patriarchy. Provided that the discrimination is not evident from the text of a 
will, freedom of testation allows a testator to pass his wealth from himself to 
another male. Thus the system of male dominance is perpetuated. In a 
country in which historical forms of dominance are so inherent in society this 
should not be allowed to continue.  
 
Thus freedom of testation should no longer be allowed to continue in its 
current form, if at all. 
 
 
 7.1 Suggestions for the amendment of testate  
  succession 
 
South African testate succession, despite attempts to ensure the 
constitutionality of wills,14 still allows for discrimination. Perhaps it is time the 
legislature amended the South African concept of freedom of testation to 
ensure that these forms of discrimination do not occur through testate 
succession. 
 
It is suggested that either freedom of testation be done away with in its 
entirety and that all estates should devolve according to the ISA or that more 
restrictions be implemented to further limit freedom of testation. An alternative 
to these suggestions would be to create a registry for South African 
                                                 
14  Such as Syfrets. 
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testaments. Such a registry could ensure that all testaments drafted in South 
Africa have to meet certain requirements and that the dispositions contained 
therein are not contrary to the Constitution. This suggestion would alleviate 
the court‟s duty as they would no longer have to hear cases concerning the 
validity of wills or the validity of clauses in such wills. However this suggestion 
has huge administrative implications for government as well as for the public. 
Wills would have to be checked for discrimination before they could be 
authorised. This requirement would restrict the number of people able to 
make a will due to time and geographical constraints, which in turn would 
mean that more estates would devolve intestate. This suggests that the best 
way forward may be to do away with freedom of testation in its entirety and 
resort to intestate succession in all cases. 
 
The ISA ensures that a deceased estate devolves upon a spouse or if there is 
no spouse upon a descendant.15 Alternatively if there is both a spouse and a 
descendant then the ISA ensures that the spouse would inherit a child‟s share 
of the estate i.e. equal with the descendant.16 If no spouse or no descendants 
exist then the ISA prescribes a hierarchy of family members who may inherit 
from the deceased estate.17 Intestate succession would ensure that no 
discrimination can occur, on any grounds, upon the devolution of a deceased 
estate. 
 
This would increase the work load of the High Court as they would have many 
more deceased estates to deal with. However when compared to the benefit 
that could be obtained for women this argument hardly seems relevant. 
Women would no longer be discriminated against in this form. This would 
ensure that women have greater access to the ownership and control of 
wealth. It would also give women the ability to create more wealth and give 
them a stronger footing in the capitalist world in which they live.  
                                                 
15  ISA 1 (1) (a) and (b). 
16  ISA 1 (c). 
17  ISA 1 (d) – (f). 
111  
8 Bibliography 
 8.1 Books 
A 
 Allendorf Marlis (English version by Ruth Michaelis-jena and Patrick 
Murray) Women in Socialist Society (George Prior Publishers Ltd 
London 1976). 
 Arjava Antti Women and Law in Late Antiquity (Clarendon Press Oxford 
1996). 
 Atkins Kim (ed) Self and Subjectivity (Blackwell Publishers Ltd                         
Oxford 2005). 
 Aquinas St. Thomas translated by the Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province Summa Theologica Complete English Edition in 
Five Volumes Volume Three II II QQ 1 – 148 (Christian Classics 
Maryland 1981). 
 Avila Charles Ownership: early Christian teaching (Sheed and Ward 
London 1983). 
B 
 Banks Olive Faces of Feminism (Martin Robertson Oxford 1981). 
 Beasley Chris What is Feminism? An Introduction to Feminist Theory 
(Sage Publications Ltd London 1999). 
 Beaud Michel translated by Tom Dickmore and Anny Lefebvre A 
History of Capitalism (The Macmillan Press Ltd London 1984). 
 Berend Ivan T An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe 
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2006). 
 Bhasin Kamla What is Patriarchy? (Kali for Women New Delhi 1994). 
 Boulding Elise The Underside of History (Westview Press Boulder 
Colorado 1976). 
 Bowles Samuel et al (eds) Understanding Capitalism 3rd ed (Oxford 
University Press New York 2005). 
112  
 Buckland WW A Manual of Roman Private Law 2nd Ed (Cambridge at 
the University Press 1939). 
 Buckland WW Elementary Principles of the Roman Private Law (WM. 
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. Florida 1994) 
 Buonamano Roberto A Genealogy of Subjective Rights (University of 
New South Wales). 
 
C 
 Cameron Rondo A Concise Economic History of the World 3rd ed 
(Oxford University Press New York 1997). 
 Carter Alan The Philosophical Foundations of Property Rights 
(Harvester Wheatsheaf New York 1989). 
 Chapman SD and Chambers JD The Beginnings of Industrial Britain 
(University Tutorial Press Ltd London 1970). 
 Chappell DJ An Economic History of England (Macdonald & Evans Ltd 
Plymouth 1962). 
 Clark Gillian Women in Late Antiquity (Clarendon Press Oxford 1993). 
 Corbett MM et al The Law of Succession in South Africa (Juta Cape 
Town 1980). 
 Cosculleula Victor The Ethics of Suicide (Garland Publishing Ins New 
York 1995). 
  
D 
 Davis RW (ed) The Origins of Modern Freedom in the West (Stanford 
University Press Stanford California 1995). 
 De Waal MJ and Schoeman-Malan MC Introduction to Succession 3rd 
ed (Juta & Co Ltd Lansdowne 2003). 
 Dobb Maurice Capitalism Yesterday and Today (Lawrence & Wishart 
Ltd London 1958). 
 Dodson Gray Elizabeth Patriarchy as a Conceptual Trap (Roundtable 
Press Wellesley, Massachusetts 1995). 
 Du Plessis JR and Kok L An Elementary Introduction to the Study of 
South African Law (Juta & Co, Ltd Capetown 1989). 
113  
 Du Plessis Robert S Transitions to Capitalism in Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1997). 
 
E 
 Edwards The History of South African Law (Butterworths Durban 
1996). 
 Elshtain Jean Bethke Public Man, Private Woman (Martin Robertson 
Oxford 1981). 
 Engles Frederick translated by Ernest Untermann The Origins of the 
Family Private Property and The State (CH Kerr and Company Chicago 
1902). 
 Evans Richard J The Feminists (Croom Helm London 1977). 
 
F 
 Freedman Estelle B (ed) The Essential Feminist Reader (The Modern 
Library New York 2007).  
 Fulcher James Capitalism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University 
Press Oxford 2004). 
 
G 
 Garnsey Peter Thinking About Property (Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge 2007). 
 Gies Frances and Joseph Women in the Middle Ages (Barnes & Noble 
Books New York 1980). 
 Goodman Michael F (ed) What is a Person? (Humana Press New 
Jersey 1988). 
 Gordon April A Transforming Capitalism and Patriarchy (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Boulder 1996). 
 Grotius Hugo The Rights of War and Peace (I) Tuck Richard (ed)  from 
the edition by Barbeyrac Jean (Liberty Fund Indianapolis). 
 Grotius Hugo The Jurisprudence of Holland I edited and translated by 
Lee RW (Clarendon Press Oxford 1926). 
 
114  
H 
 Hadley James Introduction to Roman Law (D Appleton and Company 
New York 1904). 
 Hannam June Feminism (Pearson Longman Harlow 2007). 
 Harksen Sibylle Women in the Middle Ages (Abner Schram New York 
1975). 
 Hegel GWF Elements of the Philosophy of Right edited by Wood Allen 
W, translated by Nisbet HB (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 
1991). 
 Hosten WJ et al Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory 
2nd ed (Butterworths Durban 1995). 
 Hume David A Treatise of Human Nature Árdal Páll S (ed) (Fontana / 
Collins Great Britain 1972). 
 Hunt EK Property and Prophets 6th ed (Harper & Row, Publishers New 
York 1990). 
 
I 
 Ishay Micheline R The History of Human Rights (University of California 
Press Berkley 2004). 
 
J 
 Jagger Alison M Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Rowman and 
Allenheld Totowa 1983). 
 Johnstone David Roman Law in Context (Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge 1999). 
 Jordan Constance Renaissance Feminism (Cornell University Press 
Ithaca 1990). 
 
K 
 Kant Immanuel Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (translated 
and analysed by HJ Patton) (Harper Torchbooks New York 1964). 
115  
 Kaser Max Roman Private Law (A translation by Rolf Dannenbring 
based on the tenth revised German edition of RÖMISCHES 
PRIVATERECHT) (University of South Africa Pretoria 1980). 
 Kelly JM A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Clarendon Press 
Oxford 1992). 
 Kroeze IJ Between Conceptualism and Constitutionalism: Private-Law 
and Constitutional Perspectives on Property (1997). 
L 
 Lakoff George and Johnson Mark Philosophy in the Flesh (Basic 
Books, a Member of the Perseus Books Group New York 1999). 
 Lane Peter The Industrial Revolution (Weidenfeld and Nicolson London 
1978). 
 Leage RW Roman Private Law 3rd ed (MacMillan and Co Ltd London 
1961).  
 Lee RW Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (The Clarendon Press 
Oxford 1925). 
 Lee RW The Elements of Roman Law with a translation of the Institutes 
of Justinian (Sweet & Maxwell, Limited London 1952). 
 Leghorn Lisa and Parker Katherine Woman’s worth: sexual economics 
and the world of women (Routledge & Kegan Paul Boston 1981). 
 Lerner Gerder The Creation of Feminist Consciousness (Oxford 
University Press New York 1993). 
 Lerner Gerder The Creation of Patriarchy (Oxford University Press New 
York 1986). 
 Leyser Henrietta Medieval Women: A Social History of Women in 
England 450 – 1500 (Phoenix Giant London 1996). 
 Locke John Two Treatise of Civil Government (JM Dent & Sons 
London 1924). 
M 
 Mackenzie Lord Studies in Roman Law with Comparative Views of the 
Laws of France, England and Scotland (WM. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc 
Florida 1991). 
 Magee Brian Confessions of a Philosopher (Phoenix London 2002). 
116  
 Mahoney Jack The Challenge of Human Rights (Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd Oxford UK 2007). 
 Maine Sir Henry Sumner Ancient Law (John Murray London 1920). 
 Maisel Peggy and Greenbaum Lesley Foundations of South African 
Law (Butterworths Durban 2002). 
 Malone Mary T Women and Christianity Vol I: The First Thousand 
Years (Orbis Books New York 2001). 
 Malone Mary T Women and Christianity Vol II: From 1000 to the 
Reformation (Orbis Books New York 2001). 
 Malone Mary T Women and Christianity Vol III: From Reformation to 
the 21st Century (Orbis Books New York 2001). 
 Margrave-Jones Clive V Mellows: The Law of Succession 
(Butterworths London 1993). 
 Marshall Sherrin (ed) Women in Reformation and Counter-Reformation 
Europe (Indiana University Press Bloomington 1989). 
 Marshall Jill Humanity, Freedom and Feminism (Ashgate Publishing 
Limited Hampshire 2005). 
 Marx Karl translated from the third German edition by Samuel Moore 
and Edward Aveling, Engles Frederick (ed) Capital A Critique of 
Political Economy (The Modern Library New York 1906). 
 McDaniel Walton Brooks Roman Private Life and its Survivals (Cooper 
Square Publishers, Inc New York 1963). 
 Mellone SH The Dawn of Modern Thought (Russell & Russell New 
York 1930). 
 Mellows Anthony R The Law of Succession 4th ed (Butterworths 
London 1983). 
 Merriman John A History of Modern Europe: from the Renaissance to 
the Present (WW Norton & Company New York 1996). 
 Miller Gareth The Machinery of Succession 2nd ed (Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Limited Hants 1996). 
 Morris Anne and Nott Susan All My Worldly Goods (Dartmouth 
Aldershot 1995). 
117  
 Muirhead James Historical Introduction to the Private Law of Rome 3rd 
ed (A & C Black, Ltd London 1916).  
 
N 
 Needham Paul Descartes: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 
(Akademilitteratur Sweden 1981).  
 Newman Michael Socialism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford 
University Press 2005). 
 Nye Andrea Feminist Theory and the Philosophies of Man (Croom 
Helm London 1988). 
 
O 
 O'Brien Patrick K and Quinalt Ronald (eds) The Industrial Revolution 
and British Society (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1993). 
 
P 
 Painter Sidney A History of the Middle Ages (MacMillan and Co Ltd 
London 1953). 
 Pawson Eric The Early Industrial Revolution (Batsford Academic 1979). 
 Phillips Melanie The Ascent of Woman (Abacus Great Britain 2004). 
 
R 
 Radford Ruether Rosemary Goddesses and the Divine Feminine 
(University of California Press Berkley 2005). 
 Radford Ruether Rosemary Women and Redemption (Fortress Press 
Minneapolis 1998).  
 Rider Christine An Introduction to Economic History (South-Western 
College Publishing Cincinnati 1995). 
 Rowbotham Sheila Woman's Consciousness, Man's World (Penguin 
Books Ltd Middlesex England 1973). 
 Rowbotham Sheila Women in Movement (Routledge New York 1992). 
 
 
118  
S 
 Saller Richard P Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family 
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1994). 
 Seddon Edmund Modern Economic History (Macdonald & Evans Ltd 
London 1966). 
 Seldon Arthur Capitalism: A Condensed Version (The Institute of 
Economic Affairs London 2007). 
 Shanar Shulamith translated by Galai Chaya The Fourth Estate 
(Methuen London 1983). 
 Shelton Jo-Ann As the Romans Did (Oxford University Press New York 
1998). 
 Sherman Howard J How Society Makes Itself (M.E. Sharpe Inc New 
York 2006). 
 Sohm Rudolph The Institutes: A Textbook of the History and System of 
Roman Private Law 3rd ed (The Clarendon Press Oxford 1907).  
 Solomon Robert C Continental Philosophy Since 1750 (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 1988). 
 Stark Rodney The Victory of Reason (Random House New York 2005). 
 Steinem Gloria Moving Beyond Words (Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 
London 1995). 
 Sternberg Fritz Capitalism and Socialism on Trial (Greenwood Press 
New York 1968). 
 
T 
 Tanner Emmeline M The Renaissance and The Reformation (Oxford at 
The Clarendon Press 1908). 
 Tarnas Richard The Passion of the Western Mind (Pimlico London 
1996).  
 Taylor Barbara Eve and the New Jerusalem (Virago Press Limited 
London 1983). 
 Tellegen-Couperus OE Testamentary Succession in the Constitutions 
of Diocletian (Terra Publishing Co Holland 1982). 
119  
 Thomas PHJ et al Historical Foundations of South African Private Law 
(Butterworths Durban 2000). 
 Tong Rosemarie Feminist Thought (Routledge London 1992). 
 Tuck Richard Natural Rights Theories: their origin and development 
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1979). 
 
V 
 Vaizey John Capitalism and Socialism: A History of Industrial Growth 
(Fakenham Press Limited Norfolk 1980). 
 Van Der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses A Comparative 
Analysis (Juta & Co Cape Town 1999). 
 Van Der Walt AJ The Constitutional Property Clause (Juta & Co Ltd 
Kenwyn1997). 
 Van Wijk Theo (ed) Western Europe From the Decline of Rome to the 
Reformation (Academia Pretoria 1984).  
 Viljoen Stephan Capitalism: A Historical Survey (H.A.U.M. - J.H. De 
Bussy Cape Town 1952). 
 
W 
 Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (African Book Company 
Grahamstown 1908). 
 Wollstonecraft Mary A Vindication of the Rights of Women (Deep and 
Deep Publications New Delhi  1992) 
 Woolf Greg (ed) Cambridge Illustrated History of the Roman World 
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2003).  
 
 8.2 Contributions in Books 
 
 Herlihy David “Life Expectancies for Women of the Middle Ages”  in 
Morewedge Rosmarie Thee (ed) The Role of Women in the Middle 
Ages (State University of New York Press Albany ) 1 – 22.  
120  
 Bennett Judith M “Public power and authority in the medieval English 
countryside” in Erler Mary and Kowalski Maryanne (eds) Women and 
Power in the Middle Ages 18 -36. 
 Brudage James A “The paradox of sexual equality in the early Middle 
Ages” in Mathisen Ralph W and Sivan Hagith S (eds) Shifting Frontiers 
in Late Antiquity (Variorum Hampshire 1996) 256 -264. 
 Burke Peter “Representations of the self from Petrarch to Descartes” in 
Porter Roy (ed) Rewriting the Self (Routledge London 1997)17 -28.  
 Coleman Janet “Are there any individual rights or only duties?” in 
Mäkinen Virpi and Korkman Peter (eds) Transformations in Medieval 
and Early Rights Discourse (Springer The Netherlands 2006) 3 - 36.  
 Crampe-Casnabet Michéle “A sampling of eighteenth century 
philosophy” in Zemon Davis Natalie and Farge Arlette (eds) A History 
of Women in the West III Renaissance and Enlightenment Paradoxes 
(The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1993) 315 -347.  
 De Waal MJ “The law of Succession and the Bill of Rights” in Bill of 
Rights Compendium (Butterworths Durban 1996) 3G1 – 3G15. 
 Erler Mary and Kowaleski Maryanne “Introduction” in Erler Mary and 
Kowalski Maryanne (eds) Women and Power in the Middle Ages 1 – 
17. 
 Eisenstein Zillah “Constructing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and 
Socialist Feminism” in Levine Rhonda F (ed) Enriching the Sociological 
Imagination (Koninklijke Brill Nv Leiden 2004) 225 – 247. 
 Davis Natalie Zemon and Farge Arlette (eds) “What are women 
anyway?” in A History of Women in the West III Renaissance and 
Enlightenment Paradoxes (The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press 1993) 257 – 260. 
 Ehrenreich Barbara “What is Socialist Feminism?” in Hennessy 
Rosemary and Ingraham Chrys (eds) Materialist Feminism: A Reader 
in Class, Difference and Women’s Lives (Routledge New York 1997) 
65 -70.  
121  
 Haakonssen Knud “Hugo Grotius and the history of political thought” in 
Haakonssen Knud (ed) Grotius, Pufendorf and Modern Natural Law 
239 - 265. 
 Hardwick Julie “Did gender have a Renaissance” in Meade Teresa A. 
and Wiesner-Hanks Merry E. (eds) A Companion to Gender History 
(Blackwell Publishing Malden, MA 2004) 343 – 357. 
 Hartwell RM “The origins of Capitalism: a methodological essay” in 
Pejovich Svetozar (ed) Philosophical and Economic Foundations of 
Capitalism (Lexington Books Toronto 1982) 11 - 25. 
 Hegel “Metaphysical basis of property” in Wigmore John H and 
Kocourek Albert (eds) Rational Basis of Legal Institutions The Modern 
Legal Philosophy Series Vol 14 (Gaunt Inc Florida 1998) 201 -205.  
 Hilton Rodney “Capitalism – What‟s in a name?” in Sweezy Paul et al 
The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (Verso London 1978) 145-
158.  
 Jagger Alison M “Socialist Feminism and the standpoint of women” in 
Rosen Michael and Wolff Jonathan (eds) Political Thought (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 1999) 49 -53. 
 Jordan Constance “Renaissance women defending women: arguments 
against patriarchy” in Marotti Maria Ornella (ed) Italian Women Writers 
from the Renaissance to the Present (The Pennsylvania State 
University Press Pennsylvania 1996) 55-68.  
 McMurray Orrin K “Modern limitations on liberty of testation” in 
Wigmore John H and Kocourek Albert (eds) Rational Basis of Legal 
Institutions The Modern Legal Philosophy Series Vol 14 (Gaunt Inc 
Florida 1998) 452 – 464. 
 Mill John Stuart “The Subjection of Women”, in Rossi Alice S (ed) 
Essays on Sex Equality (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1970) 
123 – 242.  
 Rogers Rebecca “Learning to be good girls and women” in Simonton 
Deborah (ed) The Routledge History of Women in Europe since 1700 
(Routledge London 2006) 93 -133.  
122  
 Schulte von Kessel Elisja “Virgins and mothers between heaven and 
earth” in Davis Natalie Zemon and Farge Arlette (eds) A History of 
Women in the West III Renaissance and Enlightenment Paradoxes 
(The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1993)132-166.  
 Sheehan Michael M “The bequest of land in England in the high Middle 
Ages”, in Banfield Lloyd (ed) Marriage, Property and Succession 
(Duncker and Humblot Berlin 1992) 309 – 326. 
 Sidgwick Henry “Freedom of bequest, from the individualistic point of 
view” in Wigmore John H and Kocourek Albert (eds) Rational Basis of 
Legal Institutions The Modern Legal Philosophy Series Vol 14 (Gaunt 
Inc Florida 1998) 445 – 451. 
 Stuurman Siep “The deconstruction of gender: Seventeenth century 
feminism and modern equality” in Knott Sarah and Taylor Barbara 
(eds) Women, Gender and Enlightenment 371 – 388.  
 Taylor Mill Harriet “Enfranchisement of Women”, in Rossi Alice S (ed) 
Essays on Sex Equality (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1970) 89 
– 121.  
 Varkemma Jussi “Summenhart‟s Theory of Rights” in Mäkinen Virpi 
and Korkman Peter (eds) Transformations in Medieval and Early Rights 
Discourse (Springer The Netherlands 2006) 119 -147. 
 West Robin “Jurisprudence and Gender” in Barnett Hilaire (ed) 
Sourcebook on Feminist Jurisprudence (Cavendish Publishing Limited 
London 1997) 227- 244. 
 
 8.3 Journals 
 
 Brune CM “The origin and history of succession in Roman law” 1910-
1911 (36) Law Magazine and Review: A Quarterly Review of 
Jurisprudence 5th series 429 - 445. 
 De Villiers Henry “The Law of South Africa” (1901) Vol. 3, No. 1 Journal 
of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series 9-16. 
123  
 De Waal MJ “The social and economic foundations of the law of 
Succession” 1997 92) Stell 162 -175. 
 Du Toit F “The constitutionally bound dead hand? The impact of 
constitutional rights and principles on freedom of testation in South 
African law” 2001 (2) Stell 222 - 257. 
 Du Toit F “The impact of social and economic factors on freedom of 
testation in Roman and Roman-Dutch law” 1999 (2) Stell 232 - 243. 
 Fletcher George P “Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective” 1987 (1-
4) Columbia Law Review 533 -558.  
 Friedman L “The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, 
Succession, and Society" 1966 Wisconsin LR 340–378 
 Hahlo HR “The case against freedom of testation” 1959 SALJ 435 - 
447. 
 Kroeze IJ “Matrix Iuris” 2005 (1) SAPL 320-334. 
 McCormick Peter “The concept of the self in political thought” (12) (4) 
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science 
politique 689-725. 
 Radin Margaret Jane “Property and personhood” 1982 (34) (5) 
Stanford Law Review 957 – 1015. 
 Robinson OF “The status of women in Roman Private Law” 1987 The 
Juridical Review 143-162. 
 Spoor Richard “Freedom of testation and social and economic 
development” 1983 Responsa Meridiana 305 -310.  
 Reiss Timothy J “Denying the body? Memory and the dilemmas of 
history in Descartes” Oct., 1996 (57) (4) Journal of the History of Ideas 
587-607. 
 Wethmar-Lemmer MM “The legal position of Roman women: a 
dissenting perspective” 2006 Fundamina 174-184. 
 Van den Bergh Rena “Roman women: sometimes equal and 
sometimes not” 2006 Fundamina 113-136. 
 Van Der Walt AJ “Marginal notes on powerful legends: critical 
perspectives on property theory” 1995 (58) Journal of Contemporary 
Roman-Dutch Law 396-420. 
124  
 Van Der Walt AJ “Tradition on trial: a critical analysis of the civil-law 
tradition in South African Property Law” (11) (1) SAJHR 169-206. 
 Weimar Peter “Inheritance contracts and public policy” 1994 (1) Journal 
of South African Law 787 - 797. 
 
 8.4 Internet Sources 
 
 Jacobs Johan “Not Over my Dead Body” 
http://www.walkers.co.za/features/deadbody.html accessed on 
3/02/2007.         
 
 8.5 Law Reports 
 
 Aronson v Estate Hart and Others 2 [1950] 2 All SA 13 (A). 
 BOE Trust Ltd and Others (211/09) [2009] ZAWCHC 88 (27 May 2009) 
(as yet unreported). 
 Ex Parte Dessels [1976] 2 All SA 67 (D). 
 Harksen v Lane No and Others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC). 
 Lotus River, Ottery, Grassy Park Residents Association and Another v 
South Peninsula Municipality 1999 (4) BCLR 440 (C). 
 Minister of Education and Another v Syfrets Trust Ltd No and Another 
2006 (4) SA 205. 
 Napier v Barkhuizen [2005] JOL 16182 (SCA) [7]. 
 Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope & 
Others 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC). 
 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 262. 
 
 8.6 Legislation 
 
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993. 
125  
 Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. 
 Law of Inheritance Amendment Act 26 of 1873 
 Succession Act 23 of 1874. 
 Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 
 Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 
 
 8.7 Foreign Legislation 
 
 Married Women's Property Act 1870. 
 Married Women‟s Property Act 1882. 
 
